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Summary 
 
 
       In the post-9/11 atmosphere, a number of things changed in American society, including 
the relationship between the presidential administration and the news media. The Bush 
administration openly stated that it did not believe in the “check-and-balance” function of the 
Fourth Estate, an alarming assertion that turned out to be true. The press quickly realized that it 
had to be cautious when commenting the administration and its policies, because reporters who 
published critical stories experienced scrutiny attacks from administration officials. The 
justifications for the scrutiny were based on patriotism, loyalty to the president and national 
security. The fact that the White House regarded opposing views and criticism as hostile 
elements that needed to be counterattacked, and even censored, was not the only result of the 
post-9/11 era.  
 
In addition to a higher lever of scrutiny, the press also faced an extremely disciplined White 
House administration in regard to information. In fact, this discipline bordered to pure secrecy at 
times, as the administration began reversing the country’s information laws and delayed the 
scheduled release of presidential papers. The record low number of press conferences with 
President Bush was another aspect that disappointed the press. ‘Secret’ tendencies were 
displayed during times of war as well, a factor that was deeply connected to the “Vietnam 
syndrome” theory. 
Although members of the news media faced scrutiny attacks, criticism and an administration 
unwilling to share information, some forces in the national news media initiated a self-reflection 
process. One of the main arguments of the self-analysis was that the national news media failed 
to fulfill their “watchdog” duties, especially in the lead up to the invasion of Iraq in 2003. As 
numerous examples illustrated, the administration’s pro-war arguments were most often placed 
on the front pages, while articles that challenged those arguments ended up in the back sections 
of the newspapers.  
The thesis’ conclusion will sum up the main arguments, and propose solutions that the media and 
the White House could attempt to apply. These solutions might improve the future 
correspondence between two of America’s most significant institutions. 
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 Introduction 
      
      
     “Congress shall make no law...abridging the freedom of the press...”  
Constitution of the United States of America, First Amendment 
 
 
 
 
Thesis and Structure 
In the post-9/11 period there have been indications that the Bush administration launched a 
stricter and more rigorous policy toward the American news media. Those in the press who 
posed critical questions and wrote critical stories about the administration and its policies were 
quickly scrutinized by administration officials. Many in the news media quickly realized that the 
Bush White House had a low tolerance threshold for opposing views and that questioning the 
national security policies could have potentially risky consequences. Some reporters lost their 
jobs, while others received ‘warnings’ that implied it was un-American to criticize the president 
as the nation faced the terror threat. In addition to a higher lever of scrutiny, the news press also 
faced a disciplined White House administration in regards of information. Fewer press 
conferences by the president and a restricted information flow led a number of individuals in the 
media to view the administration as a secret administration.  
Due to this background setting the thesis will therefore analyze the relationship between 
President George W. Bush Jr’s administration and the media from 9/11 and up until his second 
term, in an attempt to reveal the causes of government scrutiny, criticism and secrecy toward the 
American press. The specific timeline was chosen because it is from September 11 and toward 
the end of 2004 that the administration initiated historically crucial actions such as the War on 
Terror, the Patriot Act and the creation of Homeland Security Department. Although plenty 
books and articles have already been written and published about Bush’s second term, it is still 
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difficult to estimate advantages or disadvantages of the policies originating from that term 
because they are still active and unfolding.   
It is only reasonable that the first chapter starts with a short historical overview of the 
presidency-media relationship, beginning with Franklin D. Roosevelt and continuing with the 
most pivotal presidents of the century. As will be shown, every president cultivated his own 
specific relationship with the media, some of them could be described as functional, and some 
dysfunctional. Further illustrated will be the Bush administration’s critique and scrutiny aimed at 
specific media organizations and individuals. As it constitutes one significant part of the thesis, it 
is important to put forth this aspect as soon as possible. 
 
The second chapter will analyze the secretive aspect of the administration. As already 
mentioned, a number of individuals and journalists believe that the degree of discipline from the 
Bush administration toward the media has at times edged to pure secrecy, which makes this 
aspect an essential part of the thesis. It will accordingly be demonstrated with specific examples. 
The media coverage in the wars of Vietnam, the Gulf and Iraq will as well be a central issue, 
with focus on press access to the troops and embedding of reporters. As will be illustrated, 
Pentagon has behaved differently toward the media in times of war by applying both restrictive 
and unrestrictive regulations when it came to reporting from combat zones. Political theories 
such as the "Vietnam syndrome" and "collective security rules" will also be presented because 
they analyze and attempt to explain complex issues such as warfare strategies and wartime 
presidencies. 
 
In the third and final chapter, failure of professional journalism will be the central issue. 
Although there was an increasing distrust between the mainstream media and the administration 
due to limitation on information, there is currently an increasing belief among some academics 
and journalists that the American mainstream media itself failed to fulfill its duties. These 
individuals point to aspects of the Iraq war, such as the failure of starting a more critical debate 
as the Bush administration was preparing for the invasion in 2003. As is known today, the still 
ongoing war was initiated on false grounds, such as the alleged weapons of mass destruction 
(WMD) that Iraq’s dictator Saddam Hussein was supposed to possess. Therefore questions arise: 
did the media fail to be the “watchdog” in that crucial period? If that is the case: why?  
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The paper will end with a conclusion that not only sums up the chapters, but also attempts to 
propose solutions for a more improved relationship between the presidency and the American 
media in a post-9/11 era. 
 
Sources and Methods 
In order to detect relevant information and knowledge, a variety of sources will be evaluated and 
applied. The classic media will be included, such as some of the major television networks along 
with newspapers such as the New York Times and the Washington Post. 
The primary sources intended to be used are press statements from the White House, the State 
Department and the Department of Defense, transcripts from press briefings and presidential 
speeches. In hope of an interview, the White House and the State Department were initially 
contacted, and so were the New York Times, Washington Post and Fox News Network. However 
none of the mentioned responded, except of the automatic reply mail. On the other hand, the 
Information Resource Center at the American embassy in Oslo did respond, offering their help 
and guidance. Nevertheless, the university library, electronic databases and the Internet became 
the most important research tools for the thesis. 
Included with the classic media will also be Internet, because the public is turning more and 
more to this media outlet as a primary source of information. After all it was on the World Wibe 
Web that the first photographs of U.S. casualties in Iraq were posted, and consequently 
censored.1  
As secondary sources numerous books have been helpful, such as David Dadge’s Casualty of 
War: The Bush Administration’s Assault on a Free Press. Perhaps the title itself indicates what 
Dadge’s position is toward the president, however it was the first book that initiated the long 
process from an idea outline to this final thesis. After reading and examining Dadge’s work 
countless thoughts and notions were emerging, because his findings were both surprising and 
shocking. The attempted censoring and interference in the work of the Voice of America network 
was stunning, however the list of similar cases only continued. The commotion regarding 
Pentagon’s so-called Office of Strategic Influence was alarming, where the actual purpose of the 
office was to spread disinformation to foreign media organizations. After the revelation of the 
dirty tactics, the OSI was quickly dismantled,2 yet the thought that the powerful office with a 
multi-million dollar budget could have existed is scary. When the Press Fails: Political Power 
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and the News Media from Iraq to Katrina by Bennett, Lawrence and Livingston was also useful 
as it offered a number of interesting arguments about the mainstream media’s role in the build-up 
toward the Iraq War. As the book progresses it appears that the reporters, along with the 
executive editors, did not live up to their calling which was to provide a balanced and equal 
overview of all opinions in the spectrum. Instead, the focus of the coverage remained mostly on 
the administration’s assertions that were in the end left to stand unchallenged.  
After an examination of the various sources the decision was made that the turbulent relationship 
between the Bush administration and the American mainstream press needed to be explored. 
 
Other secondary sources of great value were the archives at the New York Times and the 
Washington Post. The two prominent newspapers were unavoidable as sources because they 
traditionally dictate the news agenda on a nationwide basis, and as a result many of the country’s 
local newspapers and news stations look toward the two giants when setting the headline of the 
day. Furthermore, a number of Post journalists have been in unpleasant encounters with the 
administration officials, which makes this secondary source even more relevant for the thesis. As 
will be illustrated, Post’s White House correspondent Dana Milbank faced difficulties in the 
White House after writing critical articles about the president’s administration.3  
Scholarly journals such as Columbia Journalism Review and the independent media watch group 
FAIR (Fairness& Accuracy in Reporting) have as well been useful. Their balanced and objective 
articles contributed with in-depth analysis that not only showed the direction to further new 
sources, but also helped me to comprehend some aspects of the thesis. The international JSTOR 
database must not be forgotten, as it also provided insightful and reflective academic articles. 
 
Historiography 
In the United States, freedom of the press has traditionally been perceived as necessary in order 
to have a functioning democratic society. As John Adams wrote in the Massachusetts 
Constitution: “The liberty of the press is essential to the security of the state.”4 The media are 
also often referred to as the Fourth Estate, implying that their role is a part of the system of 
checks and balances in that the media have the right to investigate and hold government officials 
accountable for their actions. In the political history of the United States there have been a 
number of incidents of media holding government officials accountable, and many would say 
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that the most famous event among these was the exposing of the Watergate affair and the release 
of the Pentagon Papers, followed by the resignation of former president Nixon in 1974. In the 
case of The New York Times Co. v. U.S. when the U.S. Supreme Court rejected the right of the 
Nixon administration to prevent the publication of the Pentagon Papers, Justice Hugo L. Black 
noted that “only a free and unrestrained press can effectively expose deception in government.”5 
With these words Justice Black approved the media’s duty to watch over government, and since 
then there have not been prior restraint cases in the Supreme Court that have involved the federal 
government.6  
However, many critics of the George W. Bush administration claim that his administration is far 
worse when compared to Nixon’s in regards of the authoritarian self-image it contains and the 
secrecy levels it displays in both domestic and foreign policy spheres. One such critic is John W. 
Dean, Nixon’s former White House Counsel who became deeply involved in the Watergate 
scandal cover up. Since that time Dean has become an author and columnist, and most notably a 
strong critical opponent of the Republican Party and conservatism. He applies strong terms when 
describing the Bush administration:  
 
George W. Bush and Richard B. Cheney have created the most secretive presidency of my 
lifetime. Their secrecy is far worse than during Watergate...Their secrecy is extreme- not merely 
unjustified and excessive but obsessive...It (the White House) has given us a presidency that 
operates on hidden agendas.7 
 
Dean claims throughout his study that the current administration has so-called “Nixonian traits” 
referring to its attempts to control the media and the use of the executive privilege. When it 
comes to its relations with the media, the Bush administration has from the start been highly 
disciplined in its information flow to the media, whether national security policies were 
concerned or domestic policies.  
 
Historian Michael Beschloss has compared the current presidency with the presidencies in the 
late part of the 19th century, “when often the occupant of the White House did not have much to 
say in public.”8  The current chief-executive himself stated early on that he does not feel obliged 
to appear on television shows “every hour of every day.”9  When a young black man was shot 
dead by the police in Cincinnati in April 2001, riots soon broke out. However it was not the 
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president who made public statements about the crucial event, but Attorney General John 
Ashcroft.  
Holding press conferences has as well been another dislike of Mr. Bush, who by late April 2001 
had held only two press conferences, both on very short notice.10 Although press conferences 
are one of the most important channels through which presidents communicate to the media a
public, they represent an “uncontrolled setting” where there is no time to prepare well-thought 
out answers to tough questions. Therefore some presidents attempt to avoid this communication 
method.
nd 
, 
11 However statistics of some of Bush’s predecessors indicate that they were not trying 
to avoid this area of their presidency. By March 2003 Bush held his eight news conferences in 
total, while President Clinton had held 30 at the same time in his first term, and the first president 
Bush was even busier with his 58 news conferences.12  Dan Bartlett, counselor to Mr. Bush put 
it simply when explaining president’s low number on press conferences: “At press conferences
you can’t control the message.”13  Although Bartlett’s argument sounds logical, other factors 
must not be discounted. Both domestic and foreign observers have emphasized Bush’s 
inarticulateness and his frequent misstatements as possible reasons for the reduction of press 
conferences. Jacob Weisberg at Slate magazine is one of those observers who has collected and 
published a majority of the president’s accidental mishaps, and despite their comic and 
entertaining character it becomes apparent why the Bush administration chose not to prioritize 
live conferences with reporters.   
 
In the period since the September 11 attacks, the administration altered its policies in many 
areas, including an even tougher and stricter policy toward the media than earlier. If a journalist 
or a news organization frequently questioned the administration’s policies on terrorism, that 
individual or organization was met with verbal attacks and criticism. The justifications for the 
critical scrutiny were based on patriotism and loyalty to the president. As will be shown, 
television commentator and comedian Bill Maher found himself at the center of attention shortly 
after the terrorist attacks when he made controversial statements about President Bush in his talk 
show. With the White House Press Secretary Ari Fleischer striking back, the situation escalated 
even further and ended with Maher’s show being cancelled by the ABC network.14 As the 
hostile public outcry at the commentator intensified and advertisers initiated a withdrawal from 
the show, the president’s press secretary nevertheless seemed to believe that another critical 
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remark needed to be made. Fleischer’s response certainly cleared up any doubt about the 
administration’s standpoint toward Maher and acted as an indirect, yet powerful element 
concerning the future of the show. 
Another journalist who faced criticism was the Washington Post’s White House correspondent 
Dana Milbank who wrote critical articles about the administration from the very start. There are 
reports in some news media circles that administration officials demanded that the paper reassign 
Milbank even before president Bush had taken office! The Post however rejected the demand 
and supported its correspondent.15  
 
Not only did some of the Bush administration’s officials criticize the media, but there were even 
attempts at censoring news stories. The interference in the work of the Voice of America 
network, which was prompted by an interview with a Taliban leader led eventually to the loss of 
several journalists’ jobs.16 Journalism became more closely scrutinized by the presidency which 
also attempted to control the media to a greater extent than the previous administration. It was 
obvious that the control on the information flow was tightened and it seemed that a concealing 
curtain increasingly separated the White House from the rest of the media. Some commentators 
viewed the post-9/11 period as a “censorious environment” however the Bush administration did 
little to reverse the negative atmosphere. In fact, more fuel was added to the fire with statements 
by high-ranking officials such as “We’re an empire now, and when we act, we create our own 
reality..” and “I don’t believe you (the media) have a check-and-balance function”.17  
 
The White House press corps soon noted that they could not remember a White House that was 
so little approachable or responsive to the press. Their complaints ranged from the modest 
number of presidential press conferences as already mentioned, to instances where some 
reporters believed they were being “frozen out” by administration officials when they asked 
questions considered unacceptable.18  Mr. Fleischer on the other hand, argued that the press had 
“plenty of access” and that he did not think it was a “matter of withholding information,” but 
rather of “withholding gossip”. With his new approach Fleisher intended to break away from 
what he termed a tradition of “gossip-mongering in the press.”19  He even got support from a 
surprising hold. Bill Clinton’s press secretary, Michael D. McCurry, viewed Fleischer’s strategy 
as more effective than the accommodating method he was applying. He believed his fellow 
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Republican’s approach was perhaps the right formula: “To be very, very disciplined and treat the 
press like caged animals and only feed them on a regular schedule.”20  
The longstanding Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) policies that were reversed by Attorney 
General Ashcroft must not be forgotten either. The so-called Ashcroft Memorandum invited all 
the departments of government to “carefully consider FOIA requests” and in case of deciding to 
withhold records- the Department of Justice would support their decision.21  
 
A Wartime Presidency 
President Bush’s presidency has often been defined as a wartime presidency, and this does not 
come as a surprise because following the 9/11 attacks, Bush and his closest team initiated a 
global war on terrorism, also called the War on Terror. The main goal of the war campaign was 
to destroy the terrorist network Al-Qaeda along with other similar terrorist organizations. 
Military operations soon followed in Afghanistan and Iraq. But not only did the administration 
launch military actions, it also established new communications structures in the White House. 
As Pika and Maltese point out, the Coalition Information Center (CIC) was created, which was a 
continual, never-ending White House communication effort to build public support abroad for 
the war on terrorism, especially among the Arab population in the Middle East.22 In January 
2003, this around-the-clock operation turned into a permanent office at the White House, named 
Office of Global Communications. As the White House itself stated, the office was to work 
“closely with the State and Defense Departments to ensure rapid response to allegations and 
rumors in the war on terror.”23  
It is interesting that the administration mentions “allegations” and “rumors” in its statement since 
those elements turn up quickly when the release of information shuts down to a minimum. For 
example, the Pentagon, with Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld at the front, imposed a tight lid 
on military news and operations in the lead-up to the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. At a time 
when the United States was about to intervene by sending hundreds of thousands of its troops 
overseas, the media along, with the public, was left with minimal information after press 
briefings with military officials. As several Pentagon correspondents maintained, their usual 
sources interpreted Rumsfeld’s instructions regarding leaks seriously and were accordingly 
restrained in their cooperation with reporters.24 In an atmosphere like that the press was left to 
mainly guess and predict. 
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 The two other significant events that took place in Bush’s wartime presidency were the signing 
of the Patriot Act and the creation of the Department of Homeland Security. The Patriot Act was 
overwhelmingly passed by Congress, and signed as law on October 26, 2001. Although it 
became law only six weeks after the terrorist attacks, the president argued that the act was 
“carefully drafted and considered.”25 He further argued that this piece of legislation would give 
intelligence agencies “better tools” in tracking down and capturing terrorists, such as allowing 
surveillance of e-mail and cell phone correspondence. As Pika and Maltese more importantly 
point out, under the act the FBI could spy on U.S. citizens and the Department of Justice could 
detain people without presenting any evidence of a crime.26  
More than a year later the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) came into existence. The so-
called “superagency” embraced twenty-two agencies and various units, making it the third 
largest department in the government. As its mission statement declared, the new department 
would “prevent terrorist attacks” within the U.S., “reduce the vulnerability of the United States 
to terrorism” and “minimize the damage, and assist in the recovery, from terrorist attacks that do 
occur within the United States.”27 The DHS was important to Bush as a wartime president 
because as he announced, the creation of DHS was “historic action to defend the United States 
and protect our citizens from the dangers of a new era.”28  
    
Despite the powerful words from the First Amendment, the executive branch has frequently 
attempted to regulate the press and the media, and the Bush administration is no exception. 
However, if there is a belief that a free news press is essential to a democratic society, then 
attempts at censoring and restricting it could pose as a potential danger to society. This is 
worrying. If the leader of the free world and his administration are involved in incorrect and 
dishonest behavior toward the Fourth Estate, then serious actions need to be taken, especially 
when matters such as FOIA information laws and the War on Terror are concerned. It is the 
public’s right to have an insight in their country leader’s affairs, and the media is the only 
institution that can fulfill that task. As has been witnessed previously, former president Nixon 
and his closest advisers were involved in political scandals that were not only a disgrace to that 
specific administration but to the entire American nation. In what way President Bush’s legacy 
will be judged remains to be seen, although there is already a rising number of both domestic and 
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international political strategists who point to the current presidency as a catastrophe for the 
United States and its people. Could the turbulent relationship with the mainstream media be part 
of that negative judgment? The following chapter takes a closer look at the scrutiny and criticism 
certain reporters and news organizations encountered in the tense post-9/11 era.  
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 Chapter 1 
 
 
          
Every modern American president in the 20th century has been aware of the notion that they 
need the media to communicate to the public, because it is through the media they can most 
effectively reach to their countrymen. But as the news media industry has grown and expanded 
its power and financial position, it has turned out to be more than just a communication tool and 
the 20th century president has realized that. As the president speaks to the public he not only 
conveys his message, but attempts to influence the public’s opinion on policy objectives he 
believes are important. The White House press team works therefore constantly to make sure that 
favorable images and news of the chief executive get presented in the media in order to gain both 
public and congressional support. However, the historical relationship between the White House 
and the press has been a mixed one; in fact, some have even labeled it as a curse. For example, a 
mutual respect was enjoyed between FDR and the Washington-based reporters, but the same can 
not be said for Clinton who was practically chased by the press at the height of the Lewinsky-
affair. Nevertheless, every modern president knows that the investigative nature of a professional 
reporter is a permanent element that automatically follows the leader of the free world. Each 
president therefore is forced to create, and maintain a somewhat stabile relationship with the 
media in order for his presidency to function properly. 
 
FDR 
As political scientist Mark J. Rozell claims in an article written originally for Pfiffner and 
Davidson, there has never been a greater master of the media than the New Deal and wartime 
president Franklin D. Roosevelt. First of all, FDR achieved stabile and respectful relations with 
the White House press corps that lasted throughout his long presidency. Flattering the reporters 
by using their first names, asking their advice on national matters, and even inviting some of 
them to join his family dinners at the White House were some of the tactics applied by the 
president.29  Yet he did establish a number of exceptional rules for the correspondents at the 
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White House: he decided what information was on-background, off-the-record, or not-for-
attribution. As Rozell points out, reporters who did not follow the president’s rules risked being 
cut off from access to the White House.30 Secondly, FDR was a master when speaking to the 
public on the radio. His very well prepared speeches, performed with precision and enthusiasm 
every time, captivated an entire nation and helped the president get support for his domestic and 
foreign policies. Thirdly, he created the White House Press Office in 1933, which became an 
important institution as its primary task was to provide information from the White House itself, 
and assist the Washington-based reporters. James E. Pollard suitably described FDR’s 
presidency over sixty years ago: 
 
[in] sum, here was an administration with a concept of public relations far beyond that of any 
predecessor. The times called for candor and frankness with the public. Much of the early 
success of the New Deal was undoubtedly due to the constant steady stream of organized 
information from the White House and to the fact that most of the working correspondents were 
on the side of Mr. Roosevelt. He played their game and very often they were inclined to play 
his.31 
 
It can be safely asserted that FDR became one of the most important presidents throughout US 
history, and not only because of his outstanding policy achievements but also because of his 
unforgettable, one-of-a-kind relationship with the media. 
 
JFK and LBJ 
John F. Kennedy has often been called America’s “first television president.” As Rozell 
suggests, JFK’s televised appearances gave him the electoral push that he needed in the 
presidential race in 1960. He appeared youthful, modern, elegant and articulate, and he used the 
popular television medium for all it was worth “to promote himself and his presidency.”32 He 
allowed cameras to film both him and his family at the White House in order for Americans to 
see their chief executive in his private element. But what he conducted most skillfully were the 
televised live press conferences. According to Theodore Sorenson, who was a Kennedy aide, the 
purpose of live coverage was meant “to inform and impress the public more than the press,” and 
to provide “a direct communication with the voters which no newspaper could alter by 
interpretation or omission.”33 Kennedy’s press conferences were serious and entertaining 
simultaneously, and they seemed to impress most of the American public because his popularity 
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ratings increased steadily. However, this media friendly president could occasionally get 
outraged by news stories. According to David Dadge, the president once tried to get reporter 
David Halberstam of The New York Times removed from his position because of his critical 
reporting in Vietnam.34  
During the Lyndon B. Johnson administration a so-called “credibility gap” emerged, which 
implied “the distance between reality and government projections about the progress of the 
Vietnam War.”35 In other words, the administration’s views and prospects of the Vietnam War 
did not correspond with the actual situation which displayed high death tolls on both sides and no 
solution in sight. As Rozell indicates, LBJ was “combative with reporters,” which was a 
complete contrast to his predecessor. Despite his troublesome relations with the press, LBJ 
became more and more engaged with the media. In fact, he had television screens and wire 
service feeds installed in the Oval Office so that he could better supervise the news coverage,36  
which was often critical toward the administration’s military escalations in Vietnam. George 
Christian, who served as the White House Press Secretary from 1966 to 1969, emphasized the 
same notion and added: “President Johnson lived and breathed the news…Not many people get 
up at five or five-thirty and start reading half a dozen newspapers, then tune in all three morning 
news shows on TV, and watch all of the Sunday interview programs and the news 
documentaries, and monitor the AP and UPI tickers in [their] office all day, and tune in the CBS 
radio news every hour on the hour.”37  
Nixon and Watergate 
The relationship between the White House and the media hit a record low point during the Nixon 
years. From the very start the president made it clear that he thought of the press as ‘the enemy.’ 
When problems started to pile up on his desk, the White House Chief of Staff H. R. Haldeman 
argued these were caused “by the determined opposition of a large number of the press corps and 
establishment media who, because of their past efforts to write Nixon off, had a vested interest in 
his ‘unsuccess.’”38 Nixon resented the media to the degree that he resorted to unusual tactics to 
reverse negative news coverage. Most importantly, he created the White House Office of 
Communications in 1969, and according to political scholar John Anthony Maltese “every 
president after him has ultimately felt compelled to embrace it.”39 Nixon’s primary motivation 
in creating the office “was to install a mechanism for bypassing the critical filter of the White 
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House press corps,”40 and one of the efforts was to reach out directly to local media. However, 
the office was, and still is mainly engaged in long-term public relations management. The goal 
is, as Pika and Maltese claim, to set the public agenda, coordinate the news flow from the entire 
executive branch, and to “aggressively promote that agenda through a form of mass 
marketing.”41 But it was the uncovering of the Watergate affair that fundamentally changed the 
White House-press relationship, and brought about increased skepticism and distrustfulness 
toward the information flow from the administration. 
The Reagan Era 
The president who adopted most of Nixon’s methods was Ronald Reagan. He copied the “line-
of-the-day” practice, which implied that one theme was selected each day and spread to the 
entire executive branch in an attempt to set the news agenda for the press. Polling data was used 
when choosing the daily theme, which in the end helped to enforce a consistency among the 
statements of various spokespersons. Maltese maintains that “television was paramount to 
Reagan,” and reveals that “the White House set up a tracking system of network newscasts to see 
how many minutes were devoted to each of the stories that the White House was promoting.”42 
This tracking system in return, made it possible for the White House to alter and adjust its 
communication tasks. Reagan was named the “Great Communicator” due to his media skills and 
ability to communicate directly to the public, and the fact that he was a former movie actor might 
have been an advantage in his relations with the press. 
Clinton 
Bill Clinton and his communications director, George Stephanopoulos, managed to alienate 
much of the White House press corps already during Clinton’s first days of the presidency. One 
of the initial decisions was to limit the corps’ access, such as closing off the upstairs foyer in the 
West Wing, where the offices of Stephanopoulos and the press secretary were located. As Pika 
and Maltese argue, reporters had been free to move around in the foyer for more than twenty 
years, where they were able to engage in informal conversations with communications 
officials.43  With the new rearrangement however, reporters felt the administration was not 
making much of an effort to provide them with information. They felt they were not being 
treated with respect, and Clinton consequently got off to a bad start with the White House 
correspondents. It is important to note the rise of the new media at the time, such as cable, 
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internet and satellite technology. Pika and Maltese suggest that once Clinton took office, he and 
his advisers planned to use the new media in order to bypass the traditional White House press 
corps.44 However, it is simply impossible to entirely circumvent the old media and Clinton 
discovered that by the time he left office. 
 
It is obvious that each president above had his own strong personality, and clashes with the news 
media were at times inevitable as they constantly covered and analyzed the presidency. But in 
each of the cases it seems that the president accepted the role of the media and the media that of 
the president. However, the current Bush administration operates with a different mindset. After 
an examination of some of its actions toward the media in the wake of 9/11, the Bush White 
House gives the impression that it views the media not as the Fourth Estate, but as a special 
interest group, or in some cases even as its worst enemy. 
 
“Watch What You’re Saying” 
According to David Dadge, the first victim in the post-9/11 climate was Bill Maher, the 
frequently sarcastic host of ABC’s show Politically Incorrect. On his September 17th, 2001 
show, Maher made controversial statements about whether the terrorists who had flown the 
airplanes into the World Trade Center towers had been cowards: “We have been the cowards 
lobbing cruise missiles from 2000 miles away. That’s cowardly.” He further continued: “Staying 
in the airplane when it hits the building...say what you want about it, [it’s] not cowardly...”45 
The reactions on the comments came instantly. FedEx Corporation proclaimed it was 
withdrawing its advertising commercial on the same day the show was aired, and two days later 
Sears, Roebuck and Company cancelled their advertisements as well after receiving complaints 
from customers. The spokeswoman of the latter specified that “Bill and his guests have every 
right to voice their freedom of speech and we applaud that. However, we have the right to
broadcast advertising where we feel it’s appropriate to reach out to our custom
 air our 
ers.”46  
In its press release, ABC sought to repair the situation by saying that the show “celebrates 
freedom of speech and encourages the animated exchange of ideas and opinions. While we 
remain sensitive to the current climate following last week’s tragedy and there needs to remain a 
forum for the expression of our nation’s diverse opinions.”47 Maher’s defense was that his 
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comments were meant for “politicians who, fearing public reaction, have not allowed our 
military to do the job they are obviously ready, willing, and able to do, and who now will, I’m 
certain, as they always have, get it done.”48  But with this statement Maher illustrates that he 
does not fully comprehend the situation. His real crime was that he displayed criticism at a time 
when many Americans viewed it as inappropriate. 
 
The White House viewed it as inappropriate as well and reacted accordingly. In his daily press 
briefing, the White House Press Secretary Ari Fleischer made an infamous statement that the 
press recited and debated in the period to follow. Fleischer declared that “[Maher’s comments] 
are reminders to all Americans that they need to watch what they say, watch what they do. This 
is not a time for remarks like that; there never is.”49 Fleischer’s words generated controversy, 
and columnist Maureen Dowd at the New York Times responded in a rather personal article. She 
recounted how policemen, firemen, the military and the American flag were “icons” in her 
family long before September 11, and declared that she does not need “instructions from Ari 
Fleischer...on the conduct of a good American. Patriotism, it seems, is the last refuge of 
spinners.”50  She concluded that “this is a time when questions and debate are what patriotism 
demands. Even the most high- minded government is not infallible.”51  
Even with Dowd’s support, Maher was forced to apologize in the end. His show however did not 
live for very long. On May 14, 2002, the Associated Press announced that Politically Incorrect 
had been cancelled by ABC. Although it was the network’s decision to cancel the show, the 
effect of Fleischer’s statement must not be disregarded. Since the function of a White House 
press secretary is to actively communicate to the media, and at times participate in media 
debates, it is no surprise that Fleischer made a statement. However, his harsh statement was 
interpreted by many as a ‘warning’ to the media, telling them that critical views were not 
tolerated, which is not an everyday event. As an official spokesperson for the White House, 
Fleischer expressed the views of the administration he represented, thereby acting as an indirect, 
yet powerful element in the controversy around Maher.  
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 VOA vs. the State Department 
On the surface, the Voice of America (VOA) network may appear like any other broadcasting 
organization, except for one fact: its creator was the federal government of the United States. 
Ever since its first air broadcast in 1942, the State Department has been a constant influence in 
the VOA’s work and management. In 1960 a charter was drafted in order to avoid too much 
political influence and protect the integrity of this network. In 1976 it was signed into law by 
President Gerald Ford. The charter says, among other things, that “VOA will serve as a 
consistently reliable and authoritative source of news. VOA news will be accurate, objective, and 
comprehensive.”52 In 1998, Congress passed the Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring Act 
that removed VOA from the State Department and placed it under the oversight of the BBG 
(Broadcasting Board of Governors), an independent federal entity with oversight authority over 
all non-military U.S. government international broadcasting.53  The BBG, however, was also 
meant as a “firewall” between the VOA and the State Department, which was, and still is, 
supposed to reduce the political pressures on the news organization. 
 
Although the VOA charter states that the news will be “objective and comprehensive,” it has not 
always been easy for the working correspondents to live up to that statement. The relationship 
between the federally supported media organization and its owner has at times been complicated, 
and clashes have occurred. One of those clashes occurred, not surprisingly, shortly after 9/11. 
 
The news that the VOA’s Pashto service in Afghanistan had managed to interview Taliban’s 
leader Mullah Omar, presented the network with a dilemma when it reached the headquarters in 
Washington. The fact that one of the world’s most wanted men at the time had given an 
exclusive interview to the VOA was stunning; however, would the interview be broadcast with 
no objections or protests? The case was discussed at an editorial meeting on September 21, 2001, 
which was attended by then acting director of the VOA, Myrna Whitworth, head of the News 
Department, Andre DeNesnera, and the heads of the regional departments. As Whitworth 
pointed out, there was no doubt that the interview would be balanced by placing it into context of 
a background story.54 As the planning of the exclusive news story continued in the editor’s 
room, critical reactions arrived from the State Department. According to the Washington Post, 
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Deputy Secretary of State Richard L. Armitage and senior National Security Council officials 
contacted members at the BBG to show their concern about broadcasting the interview, 
proclaiming it would be giving “a platform to terrorists.”55  In his daily press briefing on 
September 24, 2001, State Department spokesperson Richard Boucher said that “we didn’t think 
it was right. We didn’t think that the American taxpayer, the Voice of America, should be 
broadcasting the voice of the Taliban.”56  Regarding Mullah Omar’s message, Boucher 
commented:  
 
...carrying the interview would be confusing to the millions of listeners to what is essentially a 
US Government broadcast, paid for by the US Government. So we...talked to other Board of 
Broadcasting governors...and indicated that we felt...that Voice of America shouldn't be making 
these broadcasts, putting this man's voice on our radio. And we think, whether it was the Board 
of Governors or the Voice of America that ultimately made this decision, it was the right 
decision, and we think good sense prevailed.57  
 
On the question whether he still claimed that VOA had editorial independence, Boucher 
responded that he did, however, he emphasized that the VOA works for the BBG, and that the 
State Department has a seat on that board. He also repeated several times that Mullah Omar’s 
interview was not “newsworthy,” and that the US taxpayers “shouldn’t be broadcasting his 
propaganda.”58  
 
The staff at VOA was stunned by Boucher’s statements. An unnamed staff member told the 
Washington Post that “if this is an indication of the gag order they’re going to impose on us, we 
can’t do our jobs...How can you talk about what we’re fighting against if you don’t give these 
people voice?”59  With the mounting pressure, DeNesnera e-mailed his news department 
regarding the government’s interference: “(Their) decision is a totally unacceptable assault on 
our editorial independence, a frontal attack on our credibility...and I urge you not to fall under 
the spell of ‘self-censorship’. If you do, ‘they’ have won.”60  
The Mullah Omar interview was finally aired on September 25, 2001. The consequences 
however, were far-reaching. The acting director Whitworth lost her job when Robert R. Reilly 
was appointed as the new director of VOA. Spozhmai Maiwandi, the head of the VOA’s Pashto 
service in Afghanistan also lost her job. On October 26, 2001, she was notified that she was 
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being given a “temporary promotion,” when in practice it was a reassignment from the daily 
running of the service.61  
 
What is significant about this case is that the State Department was not the only actor that 
pressured the VOA. As mentioned earlier, unnamed senior members of the National Security 
Council (NSC) contacted the BBG to convey their concerns on the matter, a move that illustrated 
the Bush administration’s aspiration to control the media. For those who are not politically 
aware, the NSC is part of the executive office where national security and foreign policy issues 
are discussed. The council consists of high-ranking officials such as the vice president, the 
secretary of state and secretary of defense, and the president as the chairman. The fact that NSC 
members contacted the BBG in an attempt to influence the work of the broadcast network 
consequently places Bush and his closest advisers as active participants in the VOA controversy. 
 
When VOA celebrated its sixtieth anniversary on February 26, 2002, President Bush was the 
guest of honor at the ceremony. In his speech he said that “tyranny cannot survive forever in an 
atmosphere of truth. The Voice of America is not neutral between America and America’s 
enemies, between terrorism and those who defend themselves against terror...”62 The president 
however, did not specify what an “atmosphere of truth” signifies or in what manner it was to be 
achieved. Nevertheless, it is beyond doubt that the VOA did attempt to present at least a part of 
the truth by airing the Mullah Omar interview, but was initially obstructed due to the powerful 
influence by certain members from the president’s team. 
 
It seems that the staff at the VOA can be proclaimed as the winner in a difficult situation as this 
one. The journalists and editors stood firm by their actions, but there were casualties as 
illustrated. Individuals were removed from their positions, and the news organization recognized 
that it was not completely secluded from external political pressure. One anonymous VOA 
journalist said to the Washington Post that debates like these would emerge, until VOA gets its 
total independence. “We’re still the Voice of America”, he continued, “our paycheck still comes 
from the Treasury Department. So it’s a fine line.”63  Indeed it is a fine line, yet it is clear that 
there must be room for journalistic objectivity and balance without the concern of pressure and 
scrutiny from higher ranks. 
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“Unacceptable” Criticism 
Washington Post’s White House correspondent, Dana Milbank, was logically enough not a 
popular man within the Bush administration when he started writing critical articles in 2002. 
There are reports that administration officials demanded from the paper to reassign him even 
before president Bush had taken office! The Post however rejected the demand and supported its 
correspondent.64 What is also interesting is Mr. Bush’s tradition of nicknaming reporters at the 
White House, and the nickname given to Milbank, was according to the reporter himself “not 
printable in a family publication.”65  
One of Milbank’s articles that caused a great deal of outrage within the White House was “For 
Bush, Facts Are Malleable” which appeared on October 22, 2002. The piece criticized Bush at 
several areas, from Iraq-policy to proposed education policy. Milbank emphasized the 
inaccuracy between certain presidential statements and facts, such as facts presented in a 1998 
report by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) on Iraq’s ability to build nuclear 
weapons. At the time, Bush claimed that Iraq had been six months away from developing a 
weapon, while the IAEA report never made such assertion.66   
Milbank wrote that Bush’s statements had “taken some flights of fancy in recent weeks” and that 
“a president who won election victory underscoring Al Gore’s knack for distortions and 
exaggerations has been guilty of a few himself.”67 The accusations made the White House Press 
Secretary, Ari Fleischer, strike back and argue that “the president’s statements are well 
documented and supported by the facts...We reject any allegation to the contrary.”68  
 
In the aftermath Milbank himself has said that he felt the administration was frequently trying to 
“freeze” him out, and refused to assist him in his research writing as well. According to David 
Dadge, the journalist also experienced difficulties with matters such as travel schedules.69  
 
Milbank however, was not the only reporter who experienced heavy criticism from the 
administration. Another Post reporter, Thomas Ricks, faced critical comments from the 
Department of Defense chief spokesperson Lawrence DiRita in 2003. During his time in the 
department, DiRita became one of the closest assistants to Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, 
and because of his high-ranking position there is a strong possibility that he was influenced by 
the White House policies.  
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Ricks on the other hand, was the military reporter for the newspaper, who on March 2, 2003 
published a piece about the U.S. military preparations for the Iraq invasion. Although the article 
mainly reported on military tactics based on congressional testimony and briefings by the 
Defense Department, it also briefly mentioned some of the concerned retired military officials, 
such as Marine Col. Gary Anderson. Anderson, a retired expert in urban warfare, argued that the 
U.S. high-tech, airpower-oriented war-fighting strategy had become “familiar” over the past 
decade, and asserted that there was a chance it could fail when employed in Iraq. Another retired 
Marine, Lt. Gen. Paul Van Riper pointed to the logistical issue, claiming the army’s supply lines 
could become troublesome as they would be several times longer than in the Gulf War.70  
 
DiRita immediately sent a letter of complaint to the newspaper headquarters, but was not content 
with the reply he received. Therefore he arranged for a personal meeting with the paper’s 
executive editor Leonard Downie Jr., who was joined by editors Steve Coll, Liz Spayd and Mike 
Abramowitz.71  After the meeting, Downie and the rest of the Post’s management gave their full 
support to Ricks, while DiRita commented only that he had a “good meeting with the editors at 
the Post,” but wouldn’t “discuss the specifics. It was very constructive, very professional.”72  
These two cases demonstrate the administration’s  several ‘styles’ of action when it detected 
something it did not approve of, especially when it was a critical article in a national newspaper. 
Letters of complaints, face-to-face meetings and “freezing out” tactics were some of the practices 
officials applied in order to put pressure on a media organization. However, these practices 
contained the risk of leaving the impression of a dominant and censorious administration. In both 
cases the journalists could also safely count on their editors’ support and confidence, but what 
happens when they lose that network of support? 
 
Dan Guthrie and Tom Gutting, two local journalists, discovered soon that the conditions had 
changed after 9/11. Guthrie, who was a columnist for the little Daily Courier in Grants Pass, 
Oregon, wrote on September 15, 2001, that president Bush had “skedaddled” after the terrorist 
attack. He further indicated that “most of his aides and Cabinet members split for secret 
locations, too.”73 Guthrie also mentioned the brave airline passengers who put up a fight with 
the hijackers: “They put it all on the line. Against their courage the picture of Bush hiding in
Nebraska hole becomes an embarrassment.”
 a 
74 After the publication of the column, there were 
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strong reactions from readers, and Guthrie even received a death threat. He was instantly 
removed from his post by the enraged paper’s publisher, who later made the editor-in-chief 
apologize to the readers. In the apology, the editor-in-chief argued that criticism of the president 
and his administration should be “responsible”, and that calling Bush a coward was “neither 
responsible nor appropriate.”75  
Tom Gutting faced similar dilemma at his newspaper, Texas City Sun which has since merged 
into today’s Galveston County Daily News. In a September 2001 column, Gutting accused Bush 
of “flying around the country like a scared child seeking refuge in his mother’s bed after having 
a nightmare.”76 He added a contrasting parallel between the president and New York City’s 
mayor Rudy Giuliani, who was “highly visible, not hiding underground in Nebraska.” Gutting 
concluded that “because of W.'s lack of experience and failure to lead since Sept. 11, I feel 
nervous our future. But we should have known better than to trust someone who wasn't capable. 
You get what you vote for.”77  
 
As in the previous case there was a large public outcry, and Sun’s publisher apologized on the 
next day’s front page: “I offer an apology for this newspaper’s grave error in judgment in 
allowing such a disruptive piece as Tom Gutting’s ‘Bush Has Failed to Lead U.S.’ to make it to 
print...May God bless President George W. Bush and other leaders. And God bless America.”78 
The case ended with Gutting’s dismissal from the Sun. In an online article couple of weeks later, 
Gutting asserted that “the outraged citizens of Texas City are better off” because of his column, 
and if his criticisms of Bush were right, then “they heard a truth they needed to hear.” He further 
argued that in order “to be convinced of our beliefs, we must hold them up against the strongest 
arguments of those who disagree with us,”79 because that will reinforce and fortify the principle 
of the argument. 
 
The treatment of these journalists was a clear indication to the rest of the news media that dissent 
or criticism of the Bush administration was simply unacceptable. In the initial cases the 
publication of a critical story was quickly followed by scrutinized responses from administration 
officials. In the last two cases however, the enraged public’s protests turned out to be the 
decisive factor, and although no response was detected from the administration itself, one can 
logically presume that the White House was not pleased with Guthrie’s and Gutting’s 
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descriptions of the president. In fact, it is highly possible that the administration would have 
reacted if it was not for the fierce public protests. In the end, all of these incidents display one 
clear message: journalists risked verbal attacks, difficulties in their work routines and not least 
their jobs when writing and publishing a critical story. 
 
It is significant to note that the scrutiny attacks continued into the Iraq War. In the fall of 2003, it 
was the straightforward Defense Secretary Rumsfeld who directed sharp accusations toward a 
group of reporters during a visit in Iraq. After he implied that critics at home only encouraged the 
terrorists abroad and thereby complicated the ongoing U.S. war on terrorism, he elaborated: “We 
know for a fact…that terrorists studied Somalia and they studied instances where the United 
States was dealt a blow and tucked in and persuaded themselves they could, in fact, cause us to 
acquiesce in whatever it is they wanted us to do.”80 Rumsfeld further stressed that the U.S. 
would not give up the fight against terror: “The United States is not going to do that. President 
Bush is not going to do that. Now to the extent terrorists are given reason to believe he might, or 
if he is not willing to, the opponents might prevail in some way…and they take heart in that, an
that leads to more recruiting…that leads to more encouragement, or that leads to more staying 
power. Obviously that makes it more difficult.”
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These comments confirm yet again the main argument that criticism was not welcomed by t
Bush camp and that the media should instead advocate the president and his war. But what 
stands out even more is the fact that Mr. Rumsfeld also ‘warned’ the foreign media organizatio
about their coverage. His act did not accomplish what he wanted since no international media 
network let it dictate itself by the administration officials. However, the act did accomplish to 
portray the Pentagon and the Bush White House as 
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The outspoken Rumsfeld proceeded with stunning remarks even at a time when it was clear that
the situation in Iraq was deteriorating and a new course needed to be installed. In August 200
the Defense Secretary spoke at the annual American Legion’s national convention wh
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blamed the U.S. media, along with Amnesty International, for spreading “myths and 
distortions…about our troops and about our country.”82 As an example he presented a database 
search of the country’s leading newspapers, where the name of a soldier punished for misc
produced ten times as many mentions than the mentions of Sgt. Paul Ray Smith, the first 
recipient of the Medal of Honor in the War on Terror. Rumsfeld further warned the media and 
other opponents of the war that “any kind of moral or intellectual confusion about who and what
is right or wrong, can weaken the ability of free societies to persevere.”
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83 “Moral or intellectual 
confusion” is how the Defense Secretary chose to describe criticism against the Iraq war, which 
was a statement that displayed his misunderstanding of the entire situation. It seemed that he di
not realize that one of the characteristics of a healthy society is precisely when various factors 
join a debate and voice their arguments over an issue. When the issue is a ‘hot-button’ such as
 
No Pictures, Please 
The censorious post-9/11 atmosphere did not affect just television and newspapers; it reached
World Wide Web as well. The prime example is the case of Yellowtimes.org, an alternative 
news site which was shut down on March 24, 2003, after it posted photographs of U.S. prison
of war and Iraqi civilian casualties. The hosting company Vortech Hosting explained in an
mail that the account had been “suspended because of inappropriate graphic material.”84  
According to Yellowtimes.org’s editor Erich Marquardt, Vortech considered the pictures as 
breach of the contract terms that gives them wide discretion when defining graphic or adult 
content.85 Later, the hosting company clarified its position: “As ‘NO’ TV station in the U.S. i
allowing any dead U.S. soldiers or POWs to be displayed and we will not either.”86 Clashes 
between hosts and websites will certainly occur more frequently in the future, but it is relevant t
note that there are no established policies regarding such conflicts, except the actual agreement 
between the two parties. In order to resolve similar disputes, federal regulations need to be se
because there are millions of V
censor material as they wish. 
A
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50-year-old Tami Silicio had no idea how much attention she was about to get because of her 
two snapshots portraying coffins of dead US soldiers on a jumbo jet at Kuwait International 
Airport. After the two pictures were e-mailed to a friend back home, who again sent it further to 
Silicio’s hometown newspaper, the Seattle Times, the brave cargo worker was soon caught up in 
a national debate about whether photographs of coffins carrying deceased soldiers should be 
allowed to be published or not. Pentagon officials stood in defense of the already existing ban, 
arguing it was consistent with the wishes of the grieving families.87 President Bush backed the 
ban as well, which came as no surprise. The war he and his administration had fiercely advocated 
started to increase American death tolls, and it seems therefore that the ban served as a tool to 
keep the dark side of the war out of public sight. On the other end of the spectrum there were 
politicians such as Senator John Kerry, at the time the Democratic presidential candidate who 
praised Silicio for her deed.88   
 
After finally giving the newspaper the permission to publish one of the photos on its front page, 
Silicio’s intention was never to put focus on herself but direct focus at the photo and the ultimate 
price many brave young soldiers had to pay. As she explained: “The picture is about them, not 
me, about how they served their country, paid the price for our freedom, and the respect they 
receive on their way home from our military personnel at our air terminal.”89 Explaining the 
reasons why she took the pictures, she recalled: “I guess my feelings were so built up- my heart 
was so full of grief. And it came out in the picture.”90  
 
Silicio lost her job soon after the publication of the pictures. So did her husband, who also 
worked for the same contract company operating out of Kuwait International Airport. The 
president of the contract company said in a statement that “the couple had violated company and 
Defense Department policies, and that the military had identified very specific concerns.”91 The 
“specific concerns” were however not detailed, therefore one is left to wonder and guess. As 
mentioned earlier the Pentagon did not welcome the publication of the coffin images due to 
families’ feelings, which is an understandable argument. However that does not explain the 
department’s policy of allowing coffins and wounded soldiers arrive at Dover Air Force Base 
only at nighttime.92 The fact that these planes land at the mortuary base during the night creates 
the impression that certain government circles attempt to minimize, or even hide the rising war 
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casualties from the public. As already mentioned, President Bush supported the prohibition of 
releasing coffin images, and in order not to drain Americans’ tolerance for the war it is also 
easily assumed that he supported the policy where fallen soldiers arrive in the dark. 
There must have been a number of family members who would have wanted for their loved ones 
to receive the respect and honor they deserve on their return home. After all, these young men 
and women paid the ultimate sacrifice for their homeland. But where is the respect and honor as 
they land at U.S. soil in the middle of the night? 
 
As seen throughout the chapter, news organizations and journalists at both national and local 
newspapers discovered that making remarks or writing critical articles about the president and 
his administration was a costly and risky task. In the post- 9/11 atmosphere one had to be 
cautious when commenting the administration’s policies and it is interesting to note that in some 
cases a part of the American public proved to be more sensitive than the administration itself. A 
possible reason for this could be that the nation was still in shock after the attacks, and was not in 
the mood for dissenting views or opinions. The president of CNN Walter Isaacson commented 
from a network executive’s perspective that “in this (post-9/11) environment it feels slightly 
different...If you get on the wrong side of public opinion, you are going to get into trouble.”93  
He was right. 
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Chapter 2 
 
 
 
Secrecy- the first refuge of incompetents-must be at bare minimum in a democratic society, for a 
fully informed public is the basis of self-government. Those elected or appointed to positions of 
executive authority must recognize that government, in a democracy, cannot be wiser than 
people. 
 
House Committee on Government Operations, 1960 Report 
 
 
     
Another characteristic that has dominated the Bush administration’s relationship with the media 
is secrecy, which will be the main focus of this chapter. The secret aspect has displayed itself 
frequently through domestic issues, but has risen to new heights as a consequence of the War on 
Terror. With the American troops entering Afghanistan and Iraq the press followed, however, 
strict regulations imposed by the Pentagon resulted in few news stories getting published. In 
order to understand the causes of wartime policies toward the press, other cases will be 
presented, such as the Vietnam War and the Persian Gulf War.  
 
As will be shown, numerous reporters and political science scholars have described the White 
House under President Bush as extremely disciplined and coordinated in its affairs, especially 
when dealing with the press in the post-9/11 period. This discipline has often bordered to pure 
secrecy, and not rarely has the White House Press corps complained on the issue. The Time 
magazine Washington correspondent has proclaimed that the current administration is “the most 
closed- mouthed, more closed-door than any in memory”.94 Professor James Pfiffner on the 
other hand indicates that the Bush administration has been disciplined and loyal from the very 
start. He points out the lack of internal conflicts and leaks, elements that were present in other 
administrations, including Bush Senior’s.95 As possible reasons for the strict press policy, he 
suggests the sincere affection between the White House staffers and President Bush, but also 
Bush’s “high premium on loyalty and the willingness of his top staffers to aggressively enforce 
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discipline.”96 One anonymous Bush senior assistant once commented: “This is not a presidency 
under which there’s a lot of freelancing within the cabinet. It’s a very tight team, very 
regimented, very tight message discipline, and I think the cabinet officers realize a large part of 
their job is to be shields.”97 And they certainly do. After examining the loyal team Bush has 
surrounded himself with, it does not come as a surprise that the administration has acted in the 
disciplined and often, secretive way that it has.  
 
The White House Chief of Staff Andrew Card has been a central figure in holding the White 
House on a tight leash. Even the conservative Wall Street Journal remarked Card’s tactics 
toward the media when it referred to a “tightly centralized power inside the White House’s West 
Wing” and “a nearly leakproof system to shield the president from scandal and distraction- 
keeping secrets from the media, Congress and even cabinet members until Mr. Bush decides to 
reveal them, if ever.”98 The Journal more importantly pointed out that such a system has had a 
negative impact on Bush, because it steered him further and further away from reality.99 
According to The Nation’s journalist Eric Alterman, the chief executive himself has on several 
instances informed reporters that “he does not read their work,”100 a habit that has most likely 
made Bush very dependent on his closest team players. Andrew Card has additionally become 
famous for his controversial statements regarding the news media and their role, claiming that 
the media “don’t represent the public any more than other people do...I don’t believe you have a 
check-and-balance function.”101 With these alarming words, Card’s actions toward the press 
come as no surprise. 
 
Karen Hughes has also been another prominent figure within the president’s inner circle. After 
working with Bush during his Texas governance and his 2000 presidential campaign as director 
of communications, Hughes became one of the most powerful counselors in the White House, 
along with senior adviser Karl Rove and the already mentioned Andrew Card. Bush has 
reportedly said that he wants Hughes “in every meeting where major decisions are made.”102 
This veteran aide is probably the main reason why White House staffers largely refuse to 
recognize both obvious and not so obvious shortcomings of the second President Bush. With her 
dominant protective style, she feels that she has a “duty to let people know the things” that she 
knows about the president, “which are good things.”103  Although Hughes left the White House 
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already in July 2002, she remained in contact with the Bush camp, and became active again in 
Bush’s 2004 reelection campaign.104 
The fact that Card, Hughes, Karl Rove, and a number of other high-ranking officials contained 
rather negative views on the media could not result in anything else but strict discipline, 
restrictions and control. However, the 9/11 attacks rushed the White House into further 
escalations of its information policies. The announced War on Terror caused the administration 
to slowly turn off one information channel after another, and the case of the FOIA became an 
example where the administration believed considerable alterations needed to be implemented.  
 
FOIA- “Official Secrets Act” 
The Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) was initially enacted by Congress and signed into law 
by President Lyndon B. Johnson in 1966. The act was historical because it allowed for full or 
partial disclosure of previously unreleased information and documents controlled by federal 
government agencies. However, the act was even more strengthened when Congress overrode 
President Ford’s veto and passed the Privacy Act Amendment in 1974 with the aim to regulate 
government control over documents that concern not only federal government, but individuals 
and citizens as well.105 As a result, one could demand from the government to see records about 
oneself. But when the notorious Ashcroft memorandum was released matters took a different 
turn. 
On October 12, 2001, Attorney General John Ashcroft issued a memorandum that effectively 
reversed the longstanding FOIA policies, reminding initially the heads of all federal departments 
and agencies about the exemptions included in the FOIA. He then instructed them: 
 
...when you carefully consider FOIA requests and decide to withhold records, in whole or in part, 
you can be assured that the Department of Justice will defend your decisions unless they lack a 
sound legal basis or present an unwarranted risk of adverse impact on the ability of other 
agencies to protect other important records.106  
 
Ashcrofts’s decision completely contrasted with his predecessor’s policy. In 1993 President 
Clinton’s Attorney General, Janet Reno, obliged the departments and agencies to disclose any 
government information when demanded, unless it was “reasonably foreseeable that disclosure 
would be harmful.”107 As Dadge emphasizes, the new manifesto contained a negative rather 
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than a positive tone, bearing a resemblance to the standard Reagan’s Attorney General Will
French Smith once applied.
iam 
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However, the release of memorandums did not end with Mr. Ashcroft. Five months later a new 
manifesto was issued by Chief of White House Staff Andrew Card. Card’s directive not only 
instructed federal agencies to preserve classified information already exempted, but also to 
classify material that could “reveal information that would assist in the development or use of 
weapons of mass destruction,”109 even if that material happened to be more than ten years old. 
He further pointed out the importance of loopholes in the FOIA, telling the agencies they were 
free to use these if material was more than twenty-five years old.110  
 
It is interesting to note that the Bush administration began withdrawing thousands of already 
published documents and records even before the publication of Card’s memorandum. The 
spotlight centered on scientific and technical documents that might have been relevant in the 
making of chemical weapons. As Tom Ridge, then-director of homeland security said: “We’re 
working hard for a set of guidelines so terrorists can’t use information that this country produces 
against us.”111 However, some scientists critical to government’s measures raised their voices, 
saying the chances were bigger for scientific and medical progresses to be lost than for the 
information to get into the hands of terrorists.112  
 
The USA Patriot Act 
On October 26, 2001 the “Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools 
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001” was signed by the president, and 
became soon known as the “USA Patriot Act”. Although it was signed into law merely six weeks 
after the 9/11 attacks, Bush reassured the skeptics and opponents that the act was cautiously 
devised and studied.113 He further argued that the new piece of legislation would provide 
intelligence agencies “better tools” in tracking down and capturing terrorists, and one of the 
“tools” was allowing surveillance of e-mail and cell phone correspondence. In reality, however, 
the new act authorized the Attorney General and the Justice Department to secretly and 
indefinitely detain both U.S. and non- U.S. citizens if there were “reasonable grounds to believe” 
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that these individuals might be terrorists.114 Another part of the Patriot Act that caused a great 
deal of controversy was the one that authorized FBI to search and inspect libraries and 
bookstores in order to obtain reading patterns of its suspects. The striking aspect is that in the 
aftermath, it was illegal for those librarians and bookstores to notify anyone about the occurrence 
of the inspection.115  
 
As John Dean points out, opposition to this piece of legislation was detected throughout the 
entire political spectrum, even among the conservative ranks. Known not only as the former 
Republican Speaker of the House of Representatives during the Clinton presidency, but also for 
his conservative political views, Newt Gingrich said that he “strongly believes Congress 
must...limit its (Patriot Act’s) use to national security concerns and prevent it from developing 
‘mission creep’ into areas outside of national security.”116 Republican Richard Armey, at the 
time the House Majority Leader and chairman of the House Select Committee on Homeland 
Security reportedly told Bush that he thought “his Justice Department was out of control.” 
Armey did not stop there: “Are we going to save ourselves from international terrorism in order 
to deny the fundamental liberties we protect to ourselves?...It doesn’t make sense to me.”117  
From the Democrats’ side there was a somewhat successful attempt by Senator Patrick Leahy 
and several others at modifying the Patriot Act, and more alterations would have perhaps taken 
place if one of president’s loyal team players, Attorney General Ashcroft had not influenced the 
work of Congress. Ashcroft strongly maintained that further terrorist attacks were expected and 
that Congress would get blamed if the president’s legislation was not approved. The Democrats 
obeyed, and the controversial bill encountered consequently no significant floor debates or 
hearings.118 
 
In his testimony before the Senate Judiciary Committee shortly after, Ashcroft was strict in his 
view of the criticism directed at the administration’s anti- terrorism legislation: “To those who 
scare peace-loving people with phantoms of lost liberty, my message is this: Your tactics only 
aid the terrorists, for they erode our national unity and diminish our resolve. They give 
ammunition to America’s enemies, and pause to America’s friends.”119 It is not difficult to 
identify the real message between these lines: the criticism is not welcomed by the White House, 
and whoever produces it risks becoming an enemy of the state. Not only was the assumption 
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made by Attorney General controversial, but also scandalous for a country that leads the free, 
democratic world. When such a prominent administration official associated dissent with 
terrorism, and depicted opponents as traitors, it put not merely the Bush administration and the 
Justice Department in a bad light, but it contributed to a bigger polarization of opinions on the 
administration’s War on Terror. It is impossible to see how Ashcroft’s hysterical statement 
achieved something useful when it indirectly attempted to discourage a rationale debate. Jacob 
Weisberg in Slate magazine concluded that “if there is any real threat to them (national unity and 
resolve) at the moment, it comes from Ashcroft's excesses, not from the critics of those excesses. 
Indeed, to contend that it is somehow the defenders of civil liberties who threaten our national 
unity takes some chutzpah. It's the mugger blaming his victim for contributing to crime.”120 
 
New Department- Improved National Security? 
What ensued the signing of the Patriot Act was the creation of the Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS) through the Homeland Security Act in November 2002. As the new department 
embraced twenty-two agencies and various units, such as the Coast Guard, Immigration and 
Naturalization Service and Customs Service, it consequently became the third largest department 
in the government. With national security on the top of the administration’s priority list, the main 
goals were therefore to “prevent terrorist attacks” within the U.S., “reduce the vulnerability of 
the United States to terrorism”, and “minimize the damage, and assist in the recovery, from 
terrorist attacks that do occur within the United States.”121 The DHS was important to President 
Bush since it was another significant product of his wartime presidency, and as he announced, 
the creation of it was “historic action to defend the United States and protect our citizens against 
the dangers of a new era.”122  The making of the new department was certainly historical in 
terms of the structure of the federal government, because it was the largest, single government 
structural change since the creation of the Department of Defense in 1947.123  However, as 
challenges started emerging shortly after there were concerns about the efficiency of the 
department. 
 
Paul Light, an expert in government organization, indicated that an enormous assignment 
awaited Tom Ridge, at the time chosen secretary of DHS. He regarded Ridge’s task as “the most 
difficult bureaucratic reorganization since the Roman Empire tried to take over the 
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administration of Egypt.”124 Light pointed to the functions some of the involved agencies held, 
such as the functions of the Coast Guard that were not directly related to the counter- terrorism 
effort. The main intelligence agencies that obviously carry essential counter- terrorism functions, 
such as the FBI and the CIA, were in contrast kept outside the department’s jurisdiction. Light 
also emphasized possible coordination issues, remarking “it would be difficult to coordinate 22 
separate agencies under the best of circumstances”. He further pointed out the “great 
unevenness” among the agencies, referring to several of them as “damaged goods” due to large 
technology- quality differences.125  
Even a White House official observed the complex administration system: “88 congressional 
committees and subcommittees have jurisdiction over issues related to homeland security, 
and...that gives the Homeland Security Department a lot of congressional bosses to work with- 
and answer to- in its drive to make America safer.”126 In addition, the various agencies and units 
brought with them their own organized interests, which expected a continuity of the existing 
relationships.127  
Due to the large structure of the DHS struggles were inevitable, yet whether these bureaucratic 
struggles will obstruct the department’s mission of preventing terror attacks in the U.S. is still 
difficult to say. Both the department and the Bush administration have been prudent with 
releasing concrete results, therefore it is even more important that the media stays alert. 
 
The Homeland Security Act did not however only relocate the agencies under one umbrella; it 
also included the controversial “critical infrastructure” provisions. The provisions’ intent was to 
protect private companies that gave information to the government concerning “vulnerabilities in 
the nation’s critical infrastructure.” The protection, or better said the ‘award’ these companies 
would receive, was an exemption from the FOIA.128 The “critical infrastructure” provisions or 
the ‘loophole,’ as they also were quickly named, gained attention in the media. The director of 
the Heritage Foundation’s Center for Media and Public Policy, Mark Tapscott, argued in an 
editorial piece for the Washington Post that “one need not be a Harvard law graduate to see 
that…this loophole could be manipulated by clever corporate and government operators to hide 
endless varieties of potentially embarrassing and/or criminal information from public view.”129 
As he criticized the Bush administration for being too secretive toward the public and Congress, 
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Tapscott presented an ironic case when back in 1966 a young Illinois Republican congressman 
strongly advocated the passage of FOIA: 
 
Disclosure of government information is particularly important today because government is 
becoming involved in more and more aspects of every citizen’s personal and business life, and so 
access to information about how government is exercising its trust becomes increasingly 
important.130 
 
This congressman was no one else but Donald Rumsfeld, the former Defense Secretary who, as 
will be shown later, was deeply involved in various administration cover-up incidents. 
 
After a close examination of the Homeland Security Act, another important detail related to the 
news media became of interest. Title II, section 201(d) (5) specifically required the DHS to 
“develop a comprehensive plan for securing the key resources and critical infrastructure of the 
United States including… information technology and telecommunications systems...”131 
Although the term “information technology” was not specified, it is commonly applied when 
referring to the broadcast networks and the newspapers. This provision clearly instructs the 
department to devise a plan that will enable a steady take-over of the country’s information 
channels. Such a conscious attempt by the administration to obtain total control of the media in 
the name of “national security,” uncovers the true intention behind some of the post-9/11 policies 
implemented by the Bush White House.  
 
What Presidential Papers? 
After the Watergate scandal followed by Nixon’s resignation, the legislative branch recognized 
the importance of presidential papers and the rest of the material produced in the White House 
during a presidency. As a result the Presidential Records Act (PRA) was enacted in 1978 that 
changed the legal ownership of the presidential records from private to public. The new law 
obliged that the records (exempting the most sensitive material) become available to the public 
twelve years after a president leaves office, or sooner if it was the wish of the former White 
House administration.132  It also allowed a thirty-day consultation for the incumbent president to 
employ if he and his administration wanted to double-check and review the records one final 
time before their release. On January 20, 2001, 68,000 pages from the Ronald Reagan presidency 
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were ready to be dispatched, containing mainly notes from meetings and internal White House 
memos. Prior to 2001, millions of Reagan pages had been routinely released and the remaining 
68,000 pages were going to follow the same procedure. However, the Bush White House 
employed the thirty-day clause in order to reexamine the “many constitutional and legal 
questions” relating to these pages.133 From that point the thirty-day extension was prolonged 
several times, and a year after the scheduled date release only 6,000 documents had been 
dispatched.134 
The White House behavior raised suspicions among the news media and scholars. As The Nation 
pointed out, the most sensitive documents were already exempted by the PRA and delaying the 
rest for allegedly national security reasons seemed odd.135 Anna Nelson, an American University 
history professor, said that the precautions the Bush White House was taking on “national 
security” were “extreme” emphasizing the fact that the remaining 68,000 pages “are not the Iran- 
Contra papers.”136 More significantly, she recalled that a number of officials in the current Bush 
administration, such as Richard Cheney, Donald Rumsfeld and not least Bush’s own father, 
George H. W. Bush served in the Reagan administration, making them the “authors” of the 
stalled papers: “They probably don’t remember what they said, and they are feeling iffy about 
it.”137 
 
The long delay of the “Reagan pages” was most definitely furthered by a controversial Executive 
Order issued by Bush on November 1, 2001. Order no. 13233 named “Further Implementation of 
the Presidential Records Act” established new rules for management of presidential papers by 
declaring that not only could former presidents keep their papers sealed indefinitely, but also that 
vice presidents gained the right to invoke the executive privilege.138 
But most notably was the section declaring that an incumbent president could block papers of a 
former president, even if that former president had already confirmed their dispatch.139 On the 
day of the signing Ari Fleischer argued that because of the new executive order “more 
information will be forthcoming. And it will be available through a much more orderly process.” 
He continued that the order would “lay out the terms of that process, and it will help people to 
get information.”140 Fleischer’s words however, did not assure too many people, especially not 
historians, archivists and librarians. Lawsuits were filed by a number of public interest groups 
and organizations, such as the American Historical Association, the Society of American 
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Archivists and the Public Citizen. Steve Hansen, the president of the Society of American 
Archivists expressed his concerns in a letter to the House Subcommittee on Government 
Efficiency saying that order 13233 “has the potential to seriously restrict the unfettered flow of 
information upon which our nation depends.” He further urged the Congress “to take immediate 
action to overturn this action.”141 Although Congress did react by holding several sets of 
hearings and debates in an attempt to overturn Bush’s executive order and restore the original 
law, those debates however never saw floor action and consequently failed.  
The obstructions of the release of the presidential papers, along with the Executive order no. 
13233 were two classic examples of the secretive aspect of the Bush administration. They 
displayed the administration’s unwillingness to share information with the public, even though 
that information was not directly related to the president himself. Critical voices were yet again 
ignored and the concealing curtain remained in its place.  
 
The commotion surrounding the access to presidential papers did not end with Executive Order 
13233. It was elevated to a new level in April 2004 when the Bush administration quietly 
removed the head archivist at the National Archives, Clinton appointee John Carlin, and 
nominated Allen Weinstein instead. The Nation describes the national archivist position as 
crucially important in a democratic society: “He preserves our history and makes government 
records available to the public. He should also serve as an advocate for greater openness.”142 But 
Weinstein has been known for anything else but openness. His record displays troublesome 
features, especially on access issues, and many archivist and historical organizations view him as 
unqualified for the position. They refer to Weinstein’s 1999 book, The Haunted Wood: Soviet 
Espionage in America- Stalin Era that according to them breached the ethic code of International 
Council of Archives, which calls for “the widest possible access” to documents.143 What 
happened was that the book’s publisher, Random House, reportedly paid 100,000 dollars for 
exclusive access to the KGB archives. However, this “exclusive” access was never granted to 
anyone else, and shortly after the Russian government shut down its secretive archives. As a 
result it became impossible for other scholars to examine and confirm the content and sources of 
Weinstein’s book.144 Sam Tanenhaus, the senior editor of the New York Times Book Review, 
criticized Weinstein for failing to document his sources acceptably, an aspect he ascribed to 
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Weinstein’s “weakness for mystification”, which is, as Nation’s Jon Wiener sharply points out 
“not a quality you want in the archivist of the United States.”145  
 
The remarkable aspect of this story is that the nomination actually violated a law from 1984 
which attempted to depoliticize the national archivist position. The archivist was not to work 
according to the president’s wishes, would serve an indefinite term and could be removed only if 
the president provided a reason to Congress.146 The nomination of Weinstein was therefore 
regarded by numerous archivist and historical associations as a strategic political move. 
Although a registered Democrat, it was no secret that he had his close relations with Republican 
members in Congress. He served on Reagan’s transition team in the 1980s as well, and the board 
of his Center for Democracy foundation included people such as Henry Kissinger.147 Since it 
was presidential election year, there was a presumption that Bush might lose the reelection, 
which made it significantly important to have the “right man” at the National Archives. In 
addition, the scheduled release of records from Bush senior’s presidency the following year
established Weinstein’s nomination as an even higher priority. A year after he was remove
the national archivist position, Carlin had yet not received an explanation for his dismissal fro
President Bush. Still confused about the incident, he said: “I was assured they had no problem 
with what I was doing.”
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Although the illustrated use of secrecy in the Bush administration might seem alarming, it is 
nevertheless not unique. Restrictive information policies have been applied in the past, 
especially during wartime, and the media coverage in foreign conflict zones has consequently 
been affected by strict regulations imposed by the Department of Defense. It is a fact that the 
United States has employed its military forces in other countries countless times, but the next 
section will compare the media coverage in only four of these conflicts: the Vietnam War, the 
Persian Gulf War and the initial phases in the still ongoing wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. The 
specific four are chosen because they simultaneously resemble and differ when it comes to the 
press- Pentagon relationship. 
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Vietnam  
Press access in combat zones has been an everlasting issue for both the media and the 
government. How much should the U.S. government allow, or limit the presence of the press in 
war conflicts where U.S. troops are involved? The advocates of imposing limitations maintain 
they are needed in order to protect national security, while opponents argue that American 
citizens should be kept informed about military operations. A natural starting point for this 
discussion is Vietnam, because the press access granted in this case was never repeated again.  
Vietnam was America’s longest war in the 20th century, and as well the first conflict where 
television cameras were used to show and depict the war in a realistic manner. Injured, tired 
soldiers in the jungle, dead Vietnamese civilians and body bags became everyday images on 
TV sets back home. Reporters were given the liberty to move around the country as they 
wished, and the reason for this was the cooperative military administration.149 One reporter 
called the Vietnam War as “a notably convenient war to cover,”150 and many maintained the 
same. It was simple for a correspondent to get out to Saigon’s airport, jump on a helicopter that 
was heading for a location with action and then follow the ground troops wherever they were 
moving.  
Barry Zorthian, the U.S. Mission's Minister-Counselor for Public Affairs in Vietnam from 1964 
to 1968, assisted the Saigon correspondents and sought to maintain good relations with the 
press. Representing the military, he said they “had no real problems with the media giving away 
information that would harm the troops.”151 Media critic Robert McChesney on the other hand, 
disagrees and views the news coverage of Vietnam as a “classic example of the “big lie” of all 
war propaganda.” As he contends, the coverage of the rising opposition did not occur because 
of the media’s duty to report every voice on the opinion spectrum, but because of the Wall 
Street and Washington elite influence. As the war intensified, this powerful U.S. elite soon 
realized that the price tag was too high for any potential benefits in the future, and supported 
therefore a pull-out strategy.152  
 
Whatever point of view one holds on the media coverage, there is one certain aspect that stands 
out when analyzing Vietnam: the prolonged, never-ending duration of the war. The fact that the 
brutal war lasted for so long was a crucial element that ultimately defined Vietnam in the 
American collective memory. The ten-year long conflict became more and more unpopular as 
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the anti-war movement increased at home. This led, eventually, many government officials to 
believe that the opposition on its own caused the ultimate failure of the war. The term “Vietnam 
syndrome” which originated in the aftermath defines therefore several notions. Firstly it points 
to the notion of national failure and powerlessness, implying that the messy and brutal war that 
cost the lives of 58,000 American soldiers and millions of Vietnamese civilians was initiated on 
weak grounds. The Johnson administration started a large-scale involvement in Vietnam after 
the Gulf of Tonkin incident, where North Vietnamese boats allegedly attacked two U.S. naval 
ships, however reports later illustrated that the incident was based on intelligence errors, and 
that it was highly possible that there was no North Vietnamese attack at all.  
Secondly, the syndrome refers to the notion that systematic public criticism of a war leads to 
discouragement of the troops and results in failed mission in the end. Therefore it is essential 
that public support does not fade away until ‘victory’ is achieved, so that another “Vietnam” 
does not get repeated. As will be presented further in the chapter, President Bush Jr. and his 
advisers attempted to use Vietnam in order to show the important role public approval played 
during times of war. The goal was to win back some of the lost support for the Iraq war.  
 
Another popular theory among some historians indicates that since Vietnam occurred between 
World War II and the Persian Gulf War it could be treated as an “anomaly” which referred to “a 
unique case of failure whose mistakes might be “corrected” the next time.”153 This theory, 
according to historian John Carlos Rowe, supports and justifies arguments of those scholars 
who believe that the failure in Vietnam was not caused by U.S. foreign policies, but rather by 
congressional interference. As Rowe points out, the rhetoric subsequently became an essential 
part of the “re-legitimation” process of post- Vietnam foreign policies, such as policy during the 
Persian Gulf War. 
 
Persian Gulf War 
Walter Cronkite, the legendary broadcast journalist, once stated that the difference between 
military media control in previous wars and in the Persian Gulf War was “pre-censorship”- 
“telling you what you can’t see. I’d rather have post- censorship, where you could argue it out 
after you get the story.”154 Cronkite’s “pre-censorship” implied that the strict restrictions 
imposed on the press caused the loss of valuable data and reports about the Gulf War, turning 
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the war into a blank space in historiography. One imposed restriction was the notorious “pool 
system”, where pools were small groups consisting of selected reporters who were escorted on 
guided tours chosen by the Pentagon. In practice however, the majority of reporters never got 
the opportunity to spend time out in the terrain with the troops. Those few that did reported of 
intrusive and controlling Pentagon officials, supervising question-and answer sessions between 
press members and the visited unit. Nevertheless, military officials appeared to be mostly 
concerned about TV-cameras. Conferences were at times staged purely for television, while at 
other times interviews would be interrupted when the story was not portrayed according to their 
wishes.155  
When the inevitable contract with the military was signed, reporters agreed for their news 
stories to be submitted for a “security review” by Pentagon officials before publishing them. 
However, due to the fact that many stories never made it back home, a collective sense of 
frustration soon erupted. Los Angeles Times correspondent John Balzar described the press 
atmosphere at the end of the war:  
 
One journalist said he could get nothing past military censors at one headquarters until officers 
first heard the same information on the radio. ‘I don’t think anything I wrote ever got back,’ 
said another reporter. One wire service correspondent said only seven of 27 stories he filed 
made it to his editor.156 
 
Pentagon’s tight media control was explained by military and national security reasons; 
however the press corps was skeptical to that argument. In fact, there was a widespread notion 
that the censorship of news stories only served the Pentagon’s public relations campaign, and as 
Norris points out, a central part of that campaign was “the control of necrology.” The control of 
the casualty statistics, both of the U.S. soldiers and the enemy was essential to Pentagon as it 
was trying to portray the image of “the military as a technological wizard that can win war 
without killing, with minimal killing, and with visually and viscerally innocuous killing.”157 
General H. Norman Schwarzkopf, the commander-in-chief of the U.S. forces in the Persian 
Gulf had on several occasions stated that that he thought body count statistics were “not only 
meaningless but misleading” when measuring military success.158 Being a Vietnam veteran, it 
must have been extremely important for Schwarzkopf’s military administration to try to escape 
the ghosts of Vietnam. As Norris suggests, escaping the haunting Vietnam syndrome always 
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signified the accomplishment of a “double power”: a military and moral victory. A military 
victory implied a “clean” victory “by full use of American technological superiority” while a 
moral victory implied a “clean” victory “by full use of the Pentagon’s virtually absolute control 
over martial necrology.”159 
 
Only six weeks after entering the Persian Gulf, both the executive branch and military officials 
concluded that Operation Desert Storm was a success, and President Bush Sr. famously 
declared: “The specter of Vietnam has been buried forever in the desert sands of the Arabian 
peninsula….and, by God, we’ve kicked the Vietnam syndrome once and for all.”160 With 
minimal American and coalition casualties and the use of modern technology, victory was swift 
and “clean”. Or was it? Rowe counter argues the alleged victory in the Gulf, stating that the 
same errors were repeated there as in Vietnam. These errors were disregarded by both the 
government and the public, especially the casualty statistics that general Schwarzkopf viewed 
more or less as insignificant. The reality was that American casualties during nine years of 
battles and combat actions in Vietnam were exceeded by the civilian and Iraqi troop casualties 
by two to three times.161 Shocking information, however it was information the president and 
the Pentagon generals attempted to downplay. One individual who did not downplay the dark 
details of the “clean” victory was CNN correspondent Peter Arnett. Not only was he one of the 
few remaining reporters in Baghdad during the U.S. air strike campaign, but he was the only 
one with the opportunity to broadcast live. His news stories frequently showed destructed 
buildings and injured Iraqi civilians, but the culminating point was reached when Arnett 
obtained an exclusive interview with Saddam Hussein, the man who at the time was portrayed 
as the villain of the war.162  
 
The “re-legitimation” process or idea that view Vietnam as an isolated and “unique case of 
failure” in history and which upholds the consistency of government’s foreign policies, 
resembles Arthur Schlesinger Jr’s and David Halberstam’s well-known “quagmire thesis” 
developed in the 1960s. Historian Robert Divine elaborates: “Schlesinger’s quagmire thesis, 
while condemning American involvement, nevertheless excused American leaders of any real 
responsibility. It was all an accident, a tragic series of mistakes, but not one that called for a 
reconsideration of American Cold War policies or for a searching reappraisal of men and 
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decisions.”163 Even though Divine’s study was written at a time when the Cold War was still 
alive, the thesis nevertheless fails in its attempt to rationalize Vietnam as a one-time accident, 
especially when it is analyzed from a 2008 standpoint. President Bush Sr. strongly believed that 
Vietnam ghosts were buried in the Arabian Desert sands. Those ghosts however, would rise up 
from exact same sands twelve years later.  
 
Afghanistan and Iraq 
As the War on Terror was about to be initiated shortly after 9/11, many members of the media 
were becoming concerned whether access to information and to U.S. troops would be restricted. 
They had every right to be concerned, since the Bush administration made it clear that the 
released information about the war would be scrutinized carefully. As President Bush told the 
press: “Any sources and methods of intelligence will remain guarded in secret…My 
administration will not talk about how we gather intelligence, if we gather intelligence and what 
the intelligence says. That’s for the protection of the American people.”164 Press secretary 
Fleischer did not differ much from his commander-in-chief. When the White House press corps 
asked about what evidence existed on Osama Bin Laden being the main force behind the 9/11 
attacks, Fleischer responded: “You have the right to ask those questions, I have the 
responsibility not to answer them.”165 
The president’s and Fleischer’s statements do not only confirm their administration’s 
philosophy of guarding everything as a secret, but display ignorance as they proclaim that their 
secretive approach to the war is for the protection of the American people. It is amazing that the 
administration does not, or will not realize that the only reasonable way it could protect its 
citizens is by informing them, especially in crucial wartimes.  
 
As mush as reporters were dissatisfied with the work conditions during the Gulf War, their 
experiences were to become insignificant as the first bomb raids began in Afghanistan in early 
October 2001. Access to land and sea bases from which air attacks were launched was severely 
restricted, and thereby were chances to interview returning pilots reduced. Neither were 
reporters granted the permission to interview Special Operations Forces in order to check and 
verify their missions’ advancement, and to attain most importantly the number of possible 
casualties. Those few soldiers that were interviewed were not to be identified by name and 
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hometown. Out of reach were also U.S. troops in neighboring countries such as Pakistan, 
Tajikistan and Oman. A month and a half would pass before the Pentagon for the first time 
allowed a press pool to accompany a Marine operation in southern Afghanistan.166 It is ironic 
that the American media was granted such a restrictive access to its troops, because reporting 
on Alliance operations and even the Taliban was no problem. This aspect was further 
emphasized by Sandy Johnson, the Associated Press bureau chief in Washington: “Imagine this, 
there is a war being fought by Americans and we’re not there to chronicle it. We have access to 
the Northern Alliance, we have access to the Taliban, we have practically zero access to 
American forces in the theater.”167 
 
It could be speculated who in Pentagon was responsible for keeping the media at arm’s length, 
and whoever it was must have been a high-ranking official. This speculation was confirmed 
after a number of factors pointed to the same man: former Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld. 
CNN’s Pentagon correspondent, James McIntyre said that Rumsfeld issued a directive 
“essentially telling everybody not to talk about anything.” ABC’s Washington bureau chief, 
Robin Sproul agreed, adding that the Defense Department is “very much controlling access” to 
low-ranking generals and other officials who in the past have had productive relations with the 
press.168 As a result, the old, usual sources at the Pentagon interpreted Rumsfeld’s instructions 
regarding leaks seriously and were restrained in their cooperation with reporters. It is interesting 
to note that the same Rumsfeld also commented to reporters that “defending the American way 
is what the war in Afghanistan is all about, and that certainly includes freedom of the press.”169 
Obviously the Defense Secretary holds a different definition of what freedom of the press 
means, and should perhaps check what is written in the Constitution. 
 
When the war in Iraq was initiated, press conditions were drastically altered. What was 
introduced was a policy of embedding, where 500-600 journalists, many of them foreign, 
signed on to be embedded, that is assigned to a specific unit with no possibilities to move 
around freely. Embedding could be viewed as an improvement when compared to Afghanistan, 
however the contract journalists were obliged to sign did contain a list of prohibitions. 
Reporting about ongoing missions and on specific results of completed, future or even canceled 
missions was prohibited due to “operational security” reasons. So was reporting specific 
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numbers of troops and journeying around in one owns vehicle, as one could not move around 
without a unit. Some press members regarded the rules as too general and expansive, creating 
thereby a slight confusion over what exactly could be covered, and when.170 Especially the 
“operational security” element became debatable as it risked of being interpreted differently by 
individual reporters. To add further confusion to the matter, specific ground rules were to be 
outlined as journalists got to their units. These ground rules would, according to Major Tim 
Blair, the military’s media contact on embedding “change from mission to mission and location 
to location.”171 The steering mantra on embedding was so-called “security at source”, which 
basically implied that the individual unit commander would have significant influence over his 
or hers unit’s coverage. Charles L. Lewis, the Washington bureau chief for Hearst Newspapers 
was a pool correspondent in the Persian Gulf War and suggests how a “security at source” 
inspired conversation might look like: 
 
The local commander will say to the correspondent: ‘You can come into our tent and look over 
our shoulder, and we will be very up front with you and show you what we are going to do. But 
in return for that access I need to look at your copy before you file. Now, if you don’t want to 
do that, you can stand over there and when we have something that we want to tell you, we 
will.’172 
 
As Lewis points out, this system could work in the favor of the correspondent if his or hers unit 
commander is reasonable and open- minded toward the media, and the media’s purpose. 
Bushell and Cunningham at Columbia Journalism Review also recognize the advantages of 
embedding to a certain point. While one Pentagon correspondent stated that the secretive, no 
access- policy in Afghanistan might have led to “black holes in history” (as did Walter 
Cronkite’s warnings about ‘pre-censorship’ in the Persian Gulf War), Bushell and Cunningham 
argue that the censored information stands good chances of getting published in the aftermath in 
media places such as magazines, books and documentaries. Embedding may additionally 
function perfectly for so-called “soldier-in-the-sand” stories reminiscent of Ernest Pyle’s 
informal, folksy stories and Bill Mauldin cartoon drawings during World War II.173  
 
Journalist Paul Friedman addresses embedding in Iraq from a rather interesting perspective: the 
TV perspective. His main criticism is forwarded to the unsatisfied results of embedding, such as 
the “not very special” images and video-clips from the first days of the war-campaign. The 
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reasons for the useless, short footage “slices” are according to him the stressful fast pace of the 
armed forces units and, not surprisingly, the military’s restrictions due to correspondents’ safety 
(Pentagon’s concern over their safety may be one possible reason, but it is certainly not the only 
one.) Friedman further stresses the logistical aspect, pointing to the reporters’ focus on live 
transmissions that take up time and energy, two elements that could have been spent on 
research for “more complete stories.”174 It is these “complete” stories that were produced in 
Vietnam, and that were able to deliver the public a thoroughly researched and well-balanced 
narrative. Friedman describes them as “the up-close and detailed stories with beginnings, 
middles, and ends; the gritty, gripping stories about people and courage and fear and heroism”, 
and views the absence of these “timeless” pieces as the biggest flaw of embedded reporting in 
Iraq.  
The Iraq Syndrome? 
As the Iraq war tragically marked its fifth anniversary, it is impossible not to wonder whether it 
will turn into “another Vietnam”. Many will say it already has. With the U.S. invasion slowly 
spiraling into a full-scale civil war with no end in sight, thoughts run immediately to 
Schlesinger Jr’s and Halberstam’s “quagmire” theory. As the war is escalating with its daily 
suicide bombings and street battles followed by more casualties, Iraq starts to resemble a 
“quagmire” for each day that goes by. This brutal reality therefore counter strikes the 
“quagmire” assumption that Vietnam was a tragic, one-of-a-kind mistake in American history, 
when obviously a new tragic scenario is playing out in front of the entire world.  
 
What is striking is that even the commander in chief has declared a Vietnam-Iraq analogy in a 
sad attempt to reach out to the indecisive politicians about war funding. The White House has 
witnessed a steady decrease in general support for the war, and has realized that using the 
Vietnam case might help its war policy. Vietnam was therefore applied in order to 
simultaneously renew the war debate and warn of the catastrophic consequences for Iraq’s 
people and the entire region if a withdrawal would occur. The risky analogy backfired not 
surprisingly among Democratic senators such as Edward Kennedy and John Kerry, who were, 
and still are, fierce opponents of the war. Many historians dissented with president’s predictions 
as well, arguing that America’s involvement in Vietnam only worsened the situation in 
Southeast Asia.175 It could safely be asserted that the administration’s tactic of comparing Iraq 
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with Vietnam was destined to strike back. As mentioned earlier, Vietnam is, and will perhaps 
always be defined as the ultimate failure in American collective memory and comparing 
anything with it is a catastrophic move.  
 
Another noteworthy theory that requires to be presented is the theory of collective security rules 
that is very much related to 9/11 and Iraq. In his study, political scientist Brian Frederking 
suggests that 9/11 did not fundamentally change world politics, but that it instead intensified 
already existing tensions about a suitable implementation of post-cold war collective security 
rules. Frederking firstly recognizes the notion that a number of individuals in the Bush 
administration firmly believe and continue to maintain that 9/11 was a historical day that 
changed the political balance in the world and that automatically gave a right to the United 
States to apply its preemptive foreign policies. However, he quickly disagrees with this notion 
and states that a terrible terrorist event such as 9/11 can not automatically alter the rules of 
global security, emphasizing that U.S. aggressive foreign policy can not “unilaterally construct 
a war social arrangement through declarations of a “war on terrorism” or even by invading 
Iraq” because these types of actions weaken collective security rules. As he further points out, 
the international community with the UN Security Council at the front prefers the set of 
collective security rules over a unilateral U.S. war on terrorism, as has been shown through the 
various authorization acts passed in the Council and the frequent veto struggles. The War on 
Terror would immediately lead to more accomplishments if the U.S. embraced and not 
disregarded the emerging collective security standards and norms on the world political 
scene.176 
 
Although Frederking’s argument makes sense, it is not a likely scenario while the current White 
House administration is in charge. President Bush and his team have throughout the years made 
their standpoints clear, steering an aggressive, one-way foreign policy while pretty much 
ignoring objections and criticism from other holds. In order for a dramatic shift to take place in 
American foreign policy, a new, fresh presidential administration needs to occupy the White 
House. The American people are more than ready for it, and so is the rest of the world.  
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Chapter 3 
 
 
 
 As has been presented in the previous chapters, the relationship between the Bush White House 
and the media has been a struggle from day one. Reporters and correspondents have often felt 
scrutinized and criticized in their missions, and have been restricted in their coverage of U.S. 
wars conducted abroad. In addition, the high secrecy level at the White House has not exactly 
contributed to an improvement of the strenuous relations. Despite the distrust and the lack of 
confidence between the two actors, some forces in the national media have started to analyze 
themselves and their actions. A number of journalists, newspapers and academics have during 
the last four years discussed whether the mainstream media have failed to fulfill their duties, 
especially in the lead up to the invasion of Iraq in 2003. Some of the key points these media 
members point to are the absence of a thorough investigation of the administration’s arguments 
and the absence of a more critical debate. In the aftermath, the world has realized that Iraq’s 
dictator Saddam Hussein did not possess the alleged weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and 
that the entire war was initiated on false grounds. Did the national media fail to be the 
“watchdog” in that crucial period before the invasion? If that is the case, what were the causes? 
 
What Happened To Skepticism? 
In his State of the Union speech on January 29, 2002, President Bush put forth powerful claims 
about his War on Terror. He famously argued that countries such as North Korea, Iran and Iraq 
constituted a severe threat not only to the United States but to the rest of the free, democratic 
world: 
 
States like these, and their terrorist allies, constitute an axis of evil, arming to threaten the peace 
of the world. By seeking weapons of mass destruction, these regimes pose a grave and growing 
danger. They could provide these arms to terrorists, giving them the means to match their hatred. 
They could attack our allies or attempt to blackmail the United States. In any of these cases, the 
price of indifference would be catastrophic.177  
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He further made a promise: “I will not wait on events, while dangers gather. I will not stand by, 
as peril draws closer and closer.”178 It is quite clear that he did not wait, because the 
administration, along with the country’s intelligence agencies, was already devising a battle plan 
for Iraq. Not only was the administration planning a campaign where it would be claimed that 
Iraq possessed the required tools for production of WMD, but it would also assert that there was 
a connection between Iraq, Al- Qaeda and 9/11. An investigative Washington Post story (that 
was not researched any further by the Post staff or other news organizations) revealed that a 
White House Iraq Group (WHIG) was created in August 2002. The group’s mission was to 
device a media campaign which would promote and ‘sell’ the upcoming Iraq war. However, the 
planned publicity events did not begin until September, which was a carefully calculated move 
due to the summer vacation. Andrew Card, one of WHIG’s members, commented the chosen 
launch date as following: “From a marketing point of view, you don’t introduce new products in 
August.”179 Card’s statement was striking because it signaled that the campaign was no different 
than any other public relations campaign. In other words, the mission was to promote, and 
ultimately sell a product. Only in this case, the product was a war.  
 
As he sent out a warning to the world’s “evil” nations through his State of the Union speech (the 
term “evil” was used five times), Mr. Bush failed to mention the important fact that Osama Bin 
Laden and the rest of the Taliban leadership were still at loose, or the fact that the country’s 
economy was suffering from a soaring budget deficit and high unemployment. Media theorist 
Douglas Kellner argues that the 2002 State of the Union address illustrated a dangerous 
demagogue side of the president, and that the controversial “axis of evil” rhetoric demonstrated 
“a desperate willingness to say and do anything to assert U.S. power and to justify U.S. 
aggression.”180 While the international community was stunned by Bush’s aggressive speech, the 
American mainstream media applauded it. CBS’s Dan Rather proclaimed it as “a solid, even 
eloquent address,” and NBC’s Andrea Mitchell reported it as “amazing.” In his USA Today 
article, Walter Shapiro commented on Bush’s “awe-inspiring popular support,” concluding that 
the president was “more than entitled to enjoy this moment.” Former political columnist William 
Safire went as far as cheering on the commander-in-chief to strike Iran, Iraq and North Korea.181  
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The Iraq war campaign continued to roll. Although the evidence demonstrating the connection 
between the Saddam Hussein regime and Al- Qaeda was minimal, Secretary of Defense 
Rumsfeld insisted that “as we sit here, there are senior Al Qaeda in Iraq. They are there.”182 
Rumsfeld apparently chose to ignore a great amount of evidence revealing that Osama Bin Laden 
in fact denounced Saddam’s regime, and referred to it as a secular threat to Islamic 
fundamentalism. Saddam, on his hand, carried a fear toward Islamic fundamentalist groups, and 
that these would someday attempt to remove him from his throne. These two factors alone 
contradict a possible Al-Qaeda and Iraq connection, and they were therefore disregarded by 
high-ranking officials who were determined on military action.183 
 
Another well-known performance from the administration’s campaign was Colin Powell’s 
presentation at the U.N. Security Council in February 2003. The former Secretary of State 
opened his speech as if he was presenting an already established truth: “My colleagues, every 
statement I make today is backed up by sources, solid sources. These are not assertions. What we 
are giving you are facts and conclusions based on solid intelligence.”184 As he displayed 
statistics and satellite photos of alleged Iraqi weapons sites and mobile laboratories, the world 
watched and the press reported. However, a growing number of people and media watch group
claim that objectivity in journalism failed immensely when the press reported on Powell’s 
presentation. FAIR (Fairness& Accuracy in Reporting) is one of those groups. According to 
FAIR, many journalists treated the presented arguments as though they were facts, such as 
William Schneider at CNN and the patriotic Dan Rather at CBS. In one of his news 
introductions, Rather described the arguments not as allegations but as facts: “Holding a vial of 
anthrax-like powder, Powell said Saddam might have tens of thousands of liters of anthrax. He 
showed how Iraqi jets could spray that anthrax and how mobile laboratories are being used
concoct new weapons.”
s 
 to 
q is 
ilty of failing to disarm.”186  
185 Bill Schneider went as far as rejecting any doubts that might exist 
about Powell’s evidence: “No one disputes the findings Powell presented at the U.N. that Ira
essentially gu
 
FAIR pointed out the importance of reporting such claims with precautions, because recent 
history has demonstrated that satellite photos and other intelligence data could be false. Before 
the Persian Gulf War in 1991, the Bush Sr. administration used satellite pictures as well to 
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support its case for going into Kuwait. The classified photos allegedly displayed the mobilization 
of the Iraqi army on the Saudi Arabian border; however, they were dismissed as evidence in the 
aftermath when the St. Petersburg Times got hold of commercial satellite photos which displayed 
no such military activity. During the Clinton administration, a cruise missile attack on Sudan was 
also reasoned with classified intelligence information. The target at the time was an alleged 
chemical weapons factory, but subsequent investigation showed the target to be a pharmaceutical 
factory.187 
When the president revealed his reasons and arguments for an invasion, the media failed to 
challenge these as well. At a press conference in March 2003 Bush justified his pro-war policy, 
mentioning Al- Qaeda and the 9/11 attacks fourteen times in almost an hour. What followed 
would be remembered as a scandalous performance by society’s “watchdog”: not a single 
question was asked about the coming war, a fact that shocked even some of the reporters who 
were present at the conference. ABC News White House correspondent Terry Moran referred to 
the press corps as “zombies”, while another Washington-based reporter remarked to the 
American Journalism Review that it “just became an article of faith among a lot of people: Look 
at this White House press corps; it’s just abdicated all responsibility.”188  
Elizabeth Bumiller from the New York Times offered her explanation on the matter one year 
later, implying it was meaningless to dispute with the president at a point when it was clear that 
there was no turning back: 
 
I think we were very deferential, because in the East Room press conference, it’s live. It’s very 
intense. It’s frightening to stand up there. I mean, think about it. You are standing up on prime 
time live television, asking the president of the United States a question when the country is 
about to go to war. There was a very serious, somber tone that evening, and I think it made- and 
you know, nobody wanted to get into an argument with the president at this very serious time. It 
had a very heavy feeling of history to it, that press conference.189 
 
In defense of the reporters, they did land at a difficult spot when considering the secretive and 
restrained approach by the Bush administration toward the media. How should have the reporters 
examined the alleged claims? In what way were they able to check the administration’s evidence 
when the evidence, deriving from classified intelligence sources, was not available to public? 
When there is limited time and space, how should the press report on complex issues such as war 
and international terrorism? It is not easy to determine however, the fact that not one reporter 
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dared to challenge the president’s arguments at the crucial news conference just before the 
invasion is incomprehensible. The opportunity was certainly present, but where was the 
skepticism?  
 
McCarthyism Comeback? 
David Dadge suggests an interesting parallel between the Bush administration’s campaign for the 
Iraq war and Senator Joseph McCarthy’s communist witch hunt in the 1950s. After his notorious 
Wheeling speech in Wheeling, West Virginia where McCarthy claimed that he was in possession 
of a list of names of alleged communists working in the State Department, the media started to 
devote him more attention. Persistent in his mission, the senator tirelessly travelled the country 
and held speech after speech, often accusing the Truman administration for being too soft in its 
efforts to combat communism in America. His accusations received wide publicity and won him 
a large national audience. However, many newspapers and television networks failed to check 
McCarthy’s accusations and reported instead ambivalently on his crusade. One of the reasons for 
this were, according to Dadge, the senator’s dirty tactics which obstructed “good reporting”, 
especially the tactic of constantly changing the facts whenever the press closed in. One such 
example occurred in February 1950, when the number of alleged communists shifted several 
times, causing confusion about how many suspects there were and who precisely was informed 
about the ‘infiltrators.’ First, the secretary of state knew about the involved individuals, then he 
did not, and again he did. On other occasions McCarthy would further complicate matters by 
simply holding back information. When asked for a copy of the crucial list of names, he avoided 
handing it out by saying that the list was “in a suit on a plane”, or only for the secretary of state 
or President Truman to study due to ‘national security’ concerns.190 As a result, it became 
stressful to keep up with the senator and his changing statements. The extraordinary aspect is that 
McCarthy managed to manipulate the media into broadcasting his message all over the country, 
which was a crucial factor that gained him the needed momentum for his anti-communism 
activities.  
 
Dadge’s parallel is noteworthy because there is a striking resemblance between McCarthy’s 
media strategy and the Bush White House war promotion. The current presidential 
administration counted heavily on national newspapers and networks to convey its pro-invasion 
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arguments. First, administration officials would hold key speeches that were mainly reported 
uncritically, as seen through Powell’s speech at the U.N. Another pivotal example was the 
president’s State of the Union speech in January 2003, when Bush intentionally used fear to gain 
the American people’s support for going to war. Not only did he paint a grim future for America 
if action was not taken, but there was yet another attempt at connecting 9/11 with Iraq, which 
was an argument applied in his State of the Union speech already the previous year.  
The second step in the process was to expand and strengthen these key speeches. Administration 
officials, such as National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice and Vice President Cheney 
appeared on television news shows and participated in interviews, using inflated language to 
reinforce the administration’s arguments. One central illustration is Rice’s appearance on CNN’s 
Late Edition with Wolf Blitzer in September 2002. In an attempt to explain the risk of whether 
Iraq’ dictator possessed the required tools for production of WMD, she stated: “The problem 
here is that there will always be some uncertainty about how quickly he can acquire nuclear 
weapons, but we don’t want the smoking gun to be a mushroom cloud.” Finally, the statements 
would get published and broadcasted in the local and national media, and the promotion of a war 
was completed.191   
 
As mentioned earlier, it is not always simple to check claims and arguments when these are 
based on classified intelligence data or national security reasons. It is not always easy for 
reporters to break through the wall of secrecy. In the case of Senator McCarthy and his intense 
chase for communists, it took the media four years to reveal his fabricated lies. In the case of the 
Iraq war, the WMD had not been detected at all which crushed Bush’s theory about Saddam’s 
nuclear threat against America. Moreover the news media faced a dilemma: if they chose to 
disregard the administration’s Iraq policy then they gambled loosing readers or viewers. On the 
other hand, if they chose to publish or broadcast the statements they compromised presenting 
them with a lack of context. In a competitive industry such as the media, not many editors or 
directors wished to reduce their audience ratings. As a result, they opted to simply report and 
remain silent instead of activating the public and start a debate. In order to discover the causes 
for the media’s post-9/11 behavior it is necessary to journey back in history of American 
journalism. 
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Decline of Professional Journalism 
The greatest achievement in the history of American journalism was most probably the 
publishing of the Pentagon Papers and the revealing of the Watergate affair in the 1970s. In the 
historic case of New York Times Co. v. U.S. in 1971 the U.S. Supreme Court rejected the Nixon 
administration’s right to prevent the publication of the Pentagon Papers. The 47 classified 
volumes contained insightful information on how the U.S. slowly, but steadily got engaged in 
Southeast Asia. Collecting the documents was an idea that originated with former Secretary of 
Defense Robert McNamara, and resulted in a process stretching over several decades, starting 
from 1945 and into the Vietnam War. The documents contained a number of embarrassing facts 
about the U.S. foreign policy, a factor that caused nervousness and agitation throughout the 
executive branch. Speaking for the Supreme Court majority, Justice Hugo L. Black concluded 
that: 
 
In the First Amendment the Founding Fathers gave the free press the protection it must have to 
fulfill its essential role in democracy. The Press was to serve the governed not the 
governor…Only a free and unrestrained press can effectively expose deception in government. 
And paramount among the responsibilities of a free press is the duty to prevent any part of the 
government from deceiving the people and sending them off to distant lands to die of foreign 
fevers and foreign shot and shell. In my view, far from deserving condemnation for their 
courageous reporting, the New York Times, the Washington Post and other newspapers should be 
commended for serving the purpose that the Founding Fathers saw so clearly. In revealing the 
working of government that led to the Vietnam War, the newspapers nobly did precisely that 
which the Founders hoped and trusted they would do.192 
 
The Times’ victory over the presidential administration in the court, and the exposure of the 
Watergate affair were regarded as collective triumphs by the entire journalistic community. The 
golden age in American journalism reached consequently an all-time peak. However, the sweet 
triumphs carried with them side effects. The self-satisfaction and the self-content that rose 
among journalists in the following period quickly edged to arrogance and egoism. Bob 
Woodward, one of the Watergate- reporters/investigators, witnessed that members of the news 
industry not only received honors and recognitions, but were suddenly invited to the “right” 
parties and embraced by the political and economic elite. According to James Carey, this was a 
break dealer because at that moment “the vaunted progressivism of journalism was abandoned.” 
He further clarifies that “journalists accepted the role of progressive intellectuals with a mission 
to participate in the management of society,” but that they “simultaneously abandoned the 
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populist wing of progressivism with its dictate to “afflict the powerful and comfort the 
afflicted.””193 Carey continues to argue that the press had lost “credibility and respect” in the 
aftermath of Watergate, and that the public viewed the media as a self- ruling institution, 
independent not only of partisan politics but of democracy itself. He compares the atmosphere in 
the 1970s to a Werner von Braun type of journalism: “We just send the rockets up; we don’t 
know or care where they come down.”194 As the media were turning into a ‘special institution 
with special rights’, so were the golden years of American journalism slowly losing their glory. 
A new decade was approaching, and with it came the rise of media empires and powerful 
corporations. 
 
The 1980s experienced a massive technological restructuring. Personal computers became more 
and more accessible and cable television was detectable in almost every American home. In fact, 
most of the broadcasting sphere was deregulated, but that is no coincidence because the 
structural changes occurred simultaneously with the implementation of ‘Reaganomics.’ The 
Reagan administration became known for its conservative fiscal policies which were dominated 
by hefty tax cuts, immense defense spending and deregulation. Deregulation was meant to 
weaken the government’s interference on the free marked, and thus favor private interests over 
public interests. It was also meant to encourage competition however, that competition was 
accompanied by both advantages and disadvantages. One illustrative example dates from 1982, 
when a federal judge issued an order instructing the telephone giant AT&T to be divided into one 
long-distance company and twenty-two separate local phone companies. The division resulted in 
confused customers stuck with multiple phone bills. At the same time new companies, such as 
MCI and Sprint, emerged on the marked and offered lower prices, creating tougher competition 
and greater diversity on the marked.195 
 
Another consequence of the technical changes was that a phase of merging was initiated. Due to 
extra capacity in the information industry, merging was regarded as an alternative solution next 
to deregulation and privatization. The news media searched for coalition partners, and these 
consolidations resulted ultimately in large global enterprises. Carey highlights that old-fashioned 
news broadcasting was slowly ‘lost’ within these enterprises because it was exposed to heavy 
cost-cutting in order to earn a profit.196 The news sector that suffered the largest cuts was the 
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international coverage sector, which has traditionally been viewed as expensive and costly. A 
significant reduction of foreign bureaus and international correspondents stationed abroad ensued 
over the years, resulting in superficial and poorer forms of coverage back home.197 As CBS 
News foreign correspondent Tom Fenton chronicles, coverage of foreign affairs in U.S. 
newspapers and television news plummeted by shocking seventy to eighty percent in the 1980s 
and 1990s.198 With this unfortunate development, the mainstream media directed their focus at 
sensational news more than ever. Who could forget the Clinton- Lewinsky scandal, or the O. J. 
Simpson murder trial that rolled on millions of TV sets for months? 
The 1992 presidential election was yet an example where the sensational prevailed over the 
serious. What dominated the spotlight were dirty advertisement tricks and commercials, Bill 
Clinton’s extra-marital affairs, and his Vietnam draft status. The result was a low voter turnout, 
indicating that the public’s interest for politics was fading, but also that the media’s coverage of 
the election was on the wrong path.199 Although it became obvious that the press needed to 
replace its hunger for sensations with a more serious approach, it has unfortunately still not 
occurred. The news coverage of presidential elections since 1992 has more or less remained the 
same, with the intense ‘feeding-frenzy’ focused on personal, rather political issues. 
 
The average American must have been not only shocked by the 9/11 attacks, but also confused. 
Who was responsible, and what were the reasons for such a vicious act? The confusion is 
comprehendible when considering that international correspondence was positioned far down on 
the priority list for decades, and the dominant presence of profit interests in the information 
industry. How could have the average, working-class American obtained a balanced picture of 
the U.S. role in the world, especially in the Arab countries, when many news stories were lacking 
the proper context and essential in-depth analysis! One demonstrative example is the file footage 
that was aired in the U.S. media immediately after the 9/11 attacks. The outdated images and 
film clips from Afghanistan and Pakistan evidenced the long absence of foreign reporters in the 
region.200 As terrible as the attacks were, they did serve one purpose: they were a wake-up call 
not only to the nation, but to the American media. Suddenly, newspapers and broadcasting 
networks started to re-position their correspondents around the world, and international coverage 
returned on top of the priority list. However, this did not change the fact that corporate owners 
still remained responsible to their shareholders’ needs for profit, and that the news organizations 
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continued to be exposed to financial cutbacks and commercial pressures. Roberta Baskin, a CBS 
awarded journalist points out that investigative journalism has been the primary victim of the 
corporate takeover. As she explains, investigative journalism went from being a “protected and 
encouraged” element to a suspicious element: “…whereas the lawyers were once sympathetic, 
playing an advocacy role to the journalists and trying to get their stories on the air, now they’re 
representing the perspective of the owners, that investigative journalism is a lot of trouble and 
the less of it the better.”201 Charles Lewis adds that most of the present investigative journalism 
originates from insiders who leak stories to reporters.202  
 
In 2005, the Pulitzer Prize winner Laurie Garrett took bold action and resigned at Newsday 
newspaper as a protest to the present situation in journalism. In her resignation she wrote that she 
was leaving the media domain, and further elaborated:  
 
All across America news organizations have been devoured by massive corporations- and 
allegiance to stockholders, the drive for higher share prices, and push for larger dividend returns 
trumps everything that the grunts in the newsrooms consider their missions…This is terrible for 
democracy. I have been in forty- seven states of the U.S.A. since 9/11 and I can attest to the 
horrible impact the deterioration of journalism has had on the national psyche. I have found 
America a place of great and confused fearfulness.203 
 
There are probably many other serious journalists who share Garrett’s opinion, but it is highly 
unlikely that their protests and opinions will succeed in influencing the powerful media owners 
anytime soon. As long as the profits are rising and the shareholders are content, the giant media 
corporations will continue to dominate the decision-making process.  
 
The Power of the Military-Industrial Complex 
One element that can not be stressed enough when analyzing the build-up to the Iraq war is the 
powerful military-industrial complex (MIC). In short, the MIC is an interconnected network of 
financial capital and resources between the armed services, defense contractors and government 
institutions such as the Pentagon, the Congress, and the White House. The term was firstly 
introduced by President Eisenhower in 1961, when he warned the public to not let the great 
military machine gain excessive influence in American government. That warning turned out to 
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be ineffective, because the MIC has only strengthened itself and become more powerful since the 
1960s.204 
In April 2008, The New York Times revealed that the mighty Pentagon and the military-industrial 
complex played crucial roles in promoting the administration’s wartime performance. The 
conducted examination studied 8,000 pages of e-mail messages, transcripts and records, and 
concluded that the so-called “military analysts” have served as Pentagon’s communication tools 
with one purpose: promote a positive picture of the Iraq war. These analysts, often retired 
military officers, appeared countless times on all five news networks and radio as field experts to 
express their ‘independent’ opinions. According to the Times article, the still continuing media 
effort “has sought to exploit ideological and military allegiances, and also a powerful financial 
dynamic: Most of the analysts have ties to military contractors vested in the very war policies 
they are asked to assess on air.”205 The fact is that the analysts collectively represent more than 
150 military contractors, either as defense industry lobbyists, consultants or board members, 
which are relations that have rarely been disclosed to the public or the networks. Transcripts and 
records show that the analysts not only attended private briefings with Pentagon officials and 
officials such as Mr. Cheney and Alberto Gonzales, but were also taken on tours to Iraq and 
Guantanamo Bay a number of times. What was expected from them afterwards was to further 
convey the same message received during the briefings and the tours, even if that message was 
based on uncertain or false intelligence data.206  
 
There is no doubt about Pentagon’s intention with the military analysts, because the disclosed 
records frequently refer to them as “message force multipliers” or “surrogates.” Victoria Clarke, 
the former public relations executive at the Defense Department, viewed the analysts as “key 
influential” in constructing a case for war, while reporters received little attention. Don Meyer, 
an assistant to Clarke, stated: “We didn’t want to rely on them (reporters) to be our primary 
vehicle to get information out.”207 The statement confirms again the administration’s 
unwillingness to cooperate with the media and share information. What is interesting is the fact 
that Clarke’s team received help in their search for potential analysts. The article states the White 
House itself was active in the selection process, requesting lists of names and even suggesting 
potential candidates.    
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The military analysts themselves hold mixed feelings about the media campaign they were 
involved in. Some have showed regret, while others have admitted that they have used the 
meetings with senior officials to create important networks for possible business adventures in 
the future. Those who have displayed regret so far are Robert S. Bevelacqua and Kenneth Allard. 
Bevelacqua, a retired Green Beret and former Fox News analyst, described his thoughts about 
Pentagon’s approach: “It was them saying, ‘We need to stick our hands up your back and move 
your mouth for you.’”208 Allard, a former NBC military analyst, said that the media campaign 
was a “coherent, active policy,” and added: “Night and day, I felt we’d been hosed.”209 John C. 
Garrett on the other hand, felt differently. This Fox News analyst and   lobbyist at Patton Boggs 
lobby firm acknowledged using his special access and information from the briefings and the 
sponsored trips to facilitate to his clients: “You can’t help but look for that… If you know a 
capability that would fill a niche or need, you try to fill it. That’s good for everybody.”210 Not 
only did he use the opportunity to create business deals, but he was also eager to help the media 
campaign. In January 2007 he wrote to the Pentagon: “Please let me know if you have any 
specific points you want covered or that you would prefer to downplay.”211 
 
According to the Times article, the networks paid little, or no attention to the backgrounds and 
business connections of their military analysts. Mr. Allard, for instance, argued that “none of that 
ever happened.” What is even more incredible is that the networks did not comment on the fact 
that the analysts’ Iraq trips were paid by the Defense Department, which is, according to the 
article, “a clear ethical violation for most news organizations.”212 As mentioned earlier, the 
media effort still continues, and will probably continue as long as the American troops are 
involved in military actions in Iraq. 
 
In his article, McChesney further explores the role of the MIC, and argues that since the fall of 
the Soviet Union the MIC has been “seeking a substitute…with which to justify its massive 
budgets and privileges.” He highlights that several options have been proposed at various times, 
for instance a war on terrorism, a war on drugs and the drug trade from Latin American 
countries, and humanitarian intervention. However, none of these were regarded as ‘satisfactory’ 
causes in order to continue with the enormous MIC budget spending as in previous decades. 
Colin Powell, at the time a high-ranking general, described the problem in 1991: “Think hard 
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about it. I’m running out of demons. I’m running out of villains.”213 Nevertheless, the influential 
military lobby in Washington managed to convince both the Democrats and Republicans to 
preserve the massive spending. As a consequence, one-third of the world’s military expenditures 
in 2000 belonged to the United States. McChesney strongly maintains that the War on Terror 
was “a gift from heaven” for the MIC since it excused and authorized irresponsible budget 
spending and weakened accountability toward Congress. Moreover the war on global terrorism is 
an “endless” war that can never be won, and will be difficult to keep under surveillance since the 
enemy is not located at one place, as was the case with the Soviet Union Empire.214   
Kellner supports as well the notion that the powerful MIC has shaped the Bush administration, 
and adds that the Bush’s aggressive rhetoric was used in an attempt not only to warn the “evil” 
countries in the world, but also to advance the president’s missile defense shield.215 However, 
the shield never became a reality because the funding for wars in Afghanistan and Iraq took, and 
still take, their tolls on the federal budget. 
 
With powerful factors, such as the military-industrial complex dominating the Bush 
administration, and the aggressive, well-devised media campaign, one starts to wonder whether 
the Iraq war really was avoidable. Could the silent news media, that simply reported the 
administration’s allegations and chose to ignore their military analysts’ backgrounds, have 
stopped the rush to war if they had been more proactive? That is a debatable question; however 
the Fourth Estate started slowly to wake up as the foundation on which the administration based 
its evidence, started to crumble down. 
 
Confession Time 
The first sign of skepticism about the administration’s Iraq arguments came from the acclaimed 
Columbia Journalism Review (CJR). An article titled “Voices: The Lies We Bought” appeared as 
early as two months after the invasion, and posed the important self-analyzing question: “Where 
was the American Press on September 7, 2002, a day when we were sorely in need of 
reporters?”216 The date Macarthur is pointing to is clearly the launching date of the White House 
campaign that intensely promoted military action against Iraq’s regime. As he refers to the non-
existing IAEA report which Bush used as evidence, but which hardly anyone in the media 
bothered to look into, Macarthur concludes that the American media failed the nation in the 
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crusade toward war, and suggests: “Perhaps we need to adopt the rapid-response techniques used 
in public relations, something akin to James Carville’s and George Stephanopoulos’s famous 
“War Room” ethos: never leave an accusation unanswered before the end of a news cycle.”217 
What is striking is that an entire year would pass before a number of national newspapers and 
reporters caught up with Macarthur and CJR.  
In May 2004, the editors at the New York Times finally published a self-reflecting apology to its 
readers. But the paper first made the assurance that it had operated in an ordinary manner: 
 
In most cases, what we reported was an accurate reflection of the state of our knowledge at the 
time, much of it painstakingly extracted from intelligence agencies that were themselves 
dependent on sketchy information. And where those articles included incomplete information or 
pointed in a wrong direction, they were later overtaken by more and stronger information. That is 
how news coverage normally unfolds.218 
 
After reviewing hundreds of its articles however, the paper recognized it had failed to further 
investigate the weak evidence presented by government officials: 
 
But we have found a number of instances of coverage that was not as rigorous as it should have 
been. In some cases, information that was controversial then, and seems questionable now, was 
insufficiently qualified or allowed to stand unchallenged. Looking back, we wish we had been 
more aggressive in re-examining the claims as new evidence emerged—or failed to emerge.219  
 
As the Times acknowledged that the follow-up of numerous Iraq stories was poor, it 
simultaneously rejected critics that pointed the finger at certain individuals. Instead it maintained 
that the problem was a collective one: 
 
Some critics of our coverage during that time have focused blame on individual reporters. Our 
examination, however, indicates that the problem was more complicated. Editors at several 
levels who should have been challenging reporters and pressing for more skepticism were 
perhaps too intent on rushing scoops into the paper…Articles based on dire claims about Iraq 
tended to get prominent display, while follow-up articles that called the original ones into 
question were sometimes buried. In some cases, there was no follow-up at all.220 
 
One reporter that received the majority of the criticism was Judith Miller. While relying heavily 
on Iraqi exile sources such as Ahmed Chalabi, this prominent and once well-respected reporter 
frequently delivered first page stories about Iraq’s alleged weapons of mass destruction. 
However, Chalabi’s credibility was eventually questioned after it was discovered that he had 
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cultivated a close relationship with the Bush administration for years, and that his personal drive 
for a regime change had produced dubious information. In spite of this revelation, Miller did not 
seem bothered. In fact she defended her work by asserting that “if your sources are wrong, you 
are wrong.”221 Miller’s view of a journalist’s function was as well interesting: “My job isn’t to 
assess the government’s information and be an independent intelligence analyst myself. My job 
is to tell readers of The New York Times what the government thought about Iraq’s arsenal.”222 
Miller’s justifications were not tolerated by everyone in the staff. Maureen Dowd, a 
distinguished Times columnist replied that “investigative reporting is not stenography.” When it 
was found out that Miller wished to return and cover the paper’s national security section, 
Dowd’s prediction was that “the institution most in danger would be the newspaper in your (the 
readers’) hands.”223  
 
The editors’ apology caused reactions among other staff members as well. The Times’ public 
editor, Daniel Okrent, approved of the self-analytical piece, but disliked its place in the paper: it 
was back in section A10 with a lack of reference on the front page. Okrent additionally 
suggested that the newspaper could overhaul and upgrade itself by reorganizing its priorities and 
reexamine its use of government sources. Dadge concludes that the Times’ apology increased its 
credibility after the publication of Okrent’s responsive article;224 however, it is more than certain 
that the credibility rate would have reached the top if the apology had been placed on the front 
page. 
 
The next month more self-criticism arrived; this time the ‘confession’ came from The New 
Republic magazine. Although the editors of this left-leaning magazine expressed their regrets 
over supporting Bush in his march to war, their ‘apology’ was halfway successful. The article 
first stated: “We feel regret, but no shame…Our strategic rationale for war has collapsed.”225 
The editors also recognized the lack of better examination of the administration’s “shaky” 
allegations and evidence, saying that “in retrospect we should have paid more attention to thes
warning signs.”
e 
 the war 226 However, they justified the war with a “moral rationale”, arguing that
accomplished in getting rid of one of the “ghastliest regimes of our time.” Several of the 
magazine’s contributors felt that the editorial was limited, but Martin Peretz, the owner of The 
New Republic at the time, opposed of taking it any further. As a firm advocate of the Iraq war, 
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Peretz declared: “I don’t think the New Republic owes anybody an apology…There were some 
things we were mistaken about, like believing there were WMDs, but my piece lays out an 
argument for the war independent of that mistake. These apologies are silly.”227 Peretz’s type of 
opinion was, not surprisingly, upheld by the right-wing media machine. William Kristol, one of 
the editors at the conservative Weekly Standard stressed that his political magazine still 
supported the war, and that it had “no second thoughts about the justice and necessity of the 
war.”228 No second thoughts or doubts have been expressed by other conservative members of 
the media, which is a trend that will most probably continue in the future. 
 
A final big self-reflection came from the national giant The Washington Post. It is worth noticing 
that the reflection did not arrive from the editors, but from one of the paper’s most respected 
reporters, Howard Kurtz. Kurtz launched an examination of his paper’s coverage of the lead-up 
period before Iraq, including interviews with staff members and editors. What was quickly 
discovered was that in the timeline between August 2002 and March 2003, more than 140 stories 
focusing on the administration’s rhetoric fronted the first page, while articles critical of the 
administration were simply pushed to the back sections. One example shows senior reporter 
Walter Pincus as he struggles to publish his article: 
 
Days before the Iraq war began, veteran Washington Post reporter Walter Pincus put together a 
story questioning whether the Bush Administration had proof that Saddam Hussein was hiding 
weapons of mass destruction. But he ran into resistance from the paper’s editors, and his piece 
ran only after assistant managing editor Bob Woodward, who was researching a book about the 
drive toward war, “helped sell the story,” Pincus recalled. “Without him, it would have had a 
tough time getting into the paper.” Even so, the article was relegated to Page A17…229 
 
71-year old Pincus was an experienced reporter who possessed long-time acquired expertise on 
nuclear weapons. He had among other things, spent five years covering the Iran-Contra affair, 
and was a tireless reader of various committee reports and intelligence documents. His articles 
however, faced trouble in the editor’s room. There were complaints that Pincus was “cryptic” in 
his writing, and that his difficult-to-read stories had to be heavily revised in order to make it into 
the paper. The fact that the veteran reporter constantly scanned government documents and was 
willing to pursue a story for months, or even years, gained him the reputation as a “crusader”, but 
it did not seem to bother him: “That’s sort of my reputation, and I don’t deny it…Once I get on a 
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subject, I stay with it.”230 It appears that Pincus’ habit of following a story for a lengthy period of 
time was viewed as a negative feature among some staff members, but it was exactly this feature 
the Post ultimately lacked in order to reveal the actual causes behind the war. Thomas Ricks, the 
paper’s Pentagon correspondent, who had faced verbal attacks from the administration for 
several of his critical articles on Iraq, used the opportunity to express critical thoughts toward his 
own employers: 
 
“The paper was not front-paging stuff…Administration assertions were on the front page. Things 
that challenged the administration were on A18 on Sunday or A24 on Monday. There was an 
attitude among editors: Look, we’re going to war, why do we even worry about all this contrary 
stuff?”231 
 
The executive editor Leonard Downie Jr. acknowledged his share of responsibility concerning 
Post’s failure: 
 
“In retrospect…we were so focused on trying to figure out what the administration was doing 
that we were not giving the same play to people who said it wouldn’t be a good idea to go to war 
and were questioning the administration’s rationale. Not enough of those stories were put on the 
front page. That was a mistake on my part.”232 
 
Yet Mr. Downie has somehow managed to misinterpret the situation as he states: 
 
“People who were opposed to the war from the beginning and have been critical of the media’s 
coverage in the period before the war have this belief that somehow the media should have 
crusaded against the war…They have the mistaken impression that somehow if the media’s 
coverage had been different, there wouldn’t have been a war.”233 
 
It is clear that the executive editor has missed the main point which is not about “crusading” for 
or against a cause, but presenting and giving equal importance to all sides of the debate. It is only 
through this course that the public can obtain a fair and balanced view on a subject and thereby 
make a sensible and a rationale opinion. Although it was Mr. Kurtz who had initiated the 
necessary self-reflection and not the editors, recognition still must be given to the Post as a 
media institution that attempted to detect its own mistakes. 
 
Bennett, Lawrence and Livingston argue that the media’s problem goes beyond individuals such 
as Downie Jr. and Judith Miller, indicating that it might be an institutional problem. There is a 
tendency among powerful news executives to view “crusaders” as a negative factor in 
63 
 
 
journalism, and so they attempt to move away from that area by focusing heavily on government 
officials and their statements. As the media monitors government activity and gets slowly caught 
up in the Washington consensus (or as media analyst Daniel Hallin terms it, “the sphere of 
legitimate controversy”), it effectively starts to shape the public opinion along the government’s 
rationale and fails immediately to be the “watchdog” institution.234  The inclination to favour 
Washington officials over voices outside of the capital is according to Bennett, Lawrence and 
Livingston, a part of the “unwritten rules of the Washington news game” which they define as 
following: 
 
In understanding the unwritten rules of the Washington news game… it is important to recognize 
that what carries a story is not necessarily its truth or importance, but whether it is driven by 
dominant officials within institutional decision-making arenas such as executive policy circles, 
or legislative or judicial processes. The advantage generally goes to those officials with the 
greatest perceived power to affect the issues or events at hand, the greatest capacity to use the 
levers of office to advance their news narratives on a regular basis, and the best communication 
operations to spin their preferred narratives well.235 
 
The fact that prominent and influential politicians are given most of the time and space in the 
news media is no secret. But it is worth noticing that the rules of the Washington news game are 
accompanied by an unpredictable paradox: whereas reporters might be aware of their inside-
government sources being unreliable, corrupt or dishonest, they still need them in order to 
present proper “news” to their editors. Washington journalism has therefore been described as 
cynical and falsified by numerous media observers.236 The paradox has been further explored by 
journalist Kristina Borjesson, who conducted a series of interviews with several reporters and 
editors, such as Ted Koppel, the former ABC’s Nightline anchor. On the matter of the 
administration’s pro-war arguments and why the media did not stay independent in their 
coverage, Koppel’s direct response offers perhaps better insight: 
 
Borjesson: You don’t just take their word for it, do you? 
Koppel: No, I just don’t take their word for it. But when they tell me why they’re going to war, I 
certainly have to give proper deference to…if the president says I’m going to war for reasons A, 
B and C, I can’t very well stand there and say, “The president is not telling you the truth, the 
actual reason that he’s going to war is some reason he hasn’t even mentioned.” I as a reporter 
have to say, “Here is what the president is saying. Here’s what the secretary of defense is saying. 
Here’s what the director of the CIA is saying. Here’s what the members of Congress are saying.” 
And indeed, when everyone at that point who has access to the classified information is with 
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more or less one voice agreeing that, yes, there appears to be evidence that Saddam Hussein still 
has weapons of mass destruction- maybe not nuclear, but certainly chemical and probably 
biological- are you suggesting that the entire American press corps then say, “Well, horse 
manure?”237 
 
Koppel’s direct response indicates that due to Washington power and dominance, and the 
journalism’s dependence on that power, it simply became too difficult to ignore the 
administration’s rhetoric for going to war. With the constant presence of commercial pressures 
and audience ratings the news media chose not to step outside the “pack,” but took instead the 
safe road and focused most of its coverage on the Bush administration’s assertions. As a 
consequence, no efficient debate was initiated where opposing views could have been presented 
and explored. If the influential military-industrial complex is additionally considered, then it 
becomes debatable whether the press really could have stopped the march toward Iraq. Through 
his statement earlier, Washington Post’s executive editor argued his newspaper could not have 
accomplished that, however, it does not excuse the mainstream media for not operating more 
investigative as they theoretically should have done. The apologies and self-reflections did 
arrive, yet they arrived too late for the American public and the American democracy. When the 
country’s stakes were at risk, the press ultimately failed to challenge the government and hold it 
accountable.  
 
There are several solutions for an improvement of the relationship between the press and the 
White House, which will be outlined in the conclusion chapter. However, here is one proposal 
that the national mainstream media should pay attention to in the future. Professor and media 
scholar Robert Entman explains: 
  
The media should provide enough information independent of the executive branch that citizens 
can construct their own counterframes of issues and events. It is not enough for the media to 
present information in ill-digested and scattered morsels. Rather, what citizens need is a 
counterframe constructed of culturally resonant words and images, one that attains sufficient 
magnitude to gain wide understanding as a sensible alternative to the White House’s 
interpretation.238  
 
In other words, the dependence on the White House must decrease in volume and voices outside 
the capital circles need to gain more attention. After the irretrievable mishaps of Iraq, it becomes 
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more than essential that the viewpoints of critics and opponents get the equal time and space in 
the press as the government officials do. After all, one of the main purposes with the media is to 
present fair and balanced news to the public. Let us only hope that the Fourth Estate has learned 
its lessons, so that the same scenario, witnessed in 2003, does not occur in the future.  
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 Conclusion 
 
 
Review 
A number of conclusions can be drawn from the thesis, but one thing is certain: the relationship 
between the Bush White House and the American media has been a turbulent ride from day one. 
As has been illustrated, the current administration proved it self to be extremely disciplined and 
coordinated in its affairs, and one on the reasons for this was the loyal staff the president 
surrounded himself with. However, the 9/11 attacks ushered in a new era. Terms such as scrutiny 
and secrecy acquired new definitions as reporters soon discovered. A slightly critical article or a 
comment of the president and his team could produce a storm of verbal attacks. The justifications 
for the scrutiny were based on patriotism, loyalty to the president and national security.  
Talk-show commentator Bill Maher was one of the first victims of the tense atmosphere in the 
post-9/11 period. After he had referred to the United States as “cowards,” and declared that 
flying planes into buildings was “not cowardly,” controversy erupted immediately. Advertising 
companies withdrew their commercials from the show after receiving public protests, and the 
White House Press Secretary Ari Fleischer used the opportunity to remind Americans that “they 
need to watch what they say, watch what they do.”239 The statement was widely discussed in the 
aftermath, and was viewed insulting by some members of the media.240 Maher apologized in 
order to save his career, but the damage was already done; ABC network cancelled his show the 
following year. The role of Fleischer’s statement in this case is an important one, because it was 
the first time a press secretary had expressed an administration’s standpoint in such a 
straightforward manner: criticism and dissent was not tolerated by the White House, therefore all 
American citizens should pay attention to what they were saying. 
 
Not only did some of the Bush administration’s officials criticize the media, but there were even 
attempts at censoring news stories. The main example that illustrated such an attempt was the 
interference in the work of the Voice of America network, where the State Department, along 
with unnamed National Security Council members sought to stop the airing of an exclusive 
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interview with a Taliban leader. The interview was temporarily delayed, but was finally aired 
after an intense struggle between the network’s staff and government officials. The consequences 
however, were extensive, as several staff members lost their jobs or were re-positioned.241 It is 
incredible that reporters lost their jobs because of an interview, but it is even more incredible that 
the State Department and NSC members did not see the value in what one of America’s enemies 
had to say. The VOA’ staff, on the other hand, followed their journalistic instinct and realized 
the importance of the interview immediately. As one anonymous staff member told the 
Washington Post: “How can you talk about what we’re fighting against if you don’t give these 
people voice?”242   
 
As the first chapter continued to show, several of Washington Post’s reporters, such as Dana 
Milbank and Thomas Ricks, faced criticism from the administration after publishing critical 
articles. The two reporters enjoyed strong support from their editors, but the same could not be 
said for Dan Guthrie and Tom Gutting, who ended up being dismissed from their local 
newspapers. Both reporters had published articles where President Bush had been ridiculed and 
criticized for his handling of the September 11 situation. Their editors however, were outraged, 
and so was the public. It all resulted in the editors’ apologies on the next days’ front pages, along 
with the dismissals of the two journalists.243 Although no response was detected from the 
administration itself, one can logically presume that the White House was not pleased with 
Guthrie’s and Gutting’s descriptions of the president.  
 
The presidential administration did not settle with scrutinizing the U.S. media only. Former 
Defense Secretary Rumsfeld directed criticism at foreign media networks in the fall of 2003, 
because of their critical coverage of the Iraq war. At the same time, he pointed out that critics, 
both at home and abroad, encouraged the terrorists and thereby complicated the ongoing War on 
Terror.244 Analyzing Rumsfeld’s maneuver from a 2008 standpoint, it is easy to conclude that his 
attempt to quiet down dissent did not succeed. The fact that the intense war has reached its fifth 
year and cost over four thousand U.S. soldiers’ lives,245 are factors that have propelled the anti-
war movements to rise. What Mr. Rumsfeld’s criticism achieved instead, was portraying the 
Pentagon and the White House as two commanding, controlling and dominating institutions with 
no tolerance for opposing views.  
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The second chapter focused on the Bush administration’s tendency to shield its affairs from the 
news media and the public. The unwillingness to share information was explained as an effort to 
protect national security, even if that unwillingness bordered to pure secrecy at times. The 
reversal of the FOIA policies by the former Attorney General Ashcroft, the quick passing and 
signing of the Patriot Act, and the creation of the Homeland Security Department were instances 
where the administration displayed its ‘secret’ tendencies. Mr. Ashcroft encouraged the federal 
agencies and departments to use exemptions in the FOIA legislation in order to prevent release 
of federal documents. The controversial Patriot Act, signed in the wake of 9/11, indirectly stated 
that both U.S. and non- U.S. citizens could be secretly and indefinitely interrogated and 
detained,246 provisions that caused reactions among the entire political spectrum, even among the 
conservative ranks.247 The creation of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) was also a 
significant product of Bush’s wartime presidency, because the department’s main mission was to 
prevent future terrorist attacks on U.S. soil. However, the Homeland Security Act contained so-
called “critical infrastructure” provisions, which granted FOIA exemptions to private companies 
that provided “critical infrastructure” information to the government.248 These “critical 
infrastructure” provisions were quickly named ‘loopholes,’ because they were easily exposed to 
manipulation by corporate and government officials who wished to conceal undesirable 
information.249   
 
The delayed dispatching of 68,000 pages from the Reagan presidency was another instance 
where the Bush administration revealed its dislike for sharing information. Although the most 
sensitive documents from the Reagan administration had been exempted by the Presidential 
Records Act of 1978, the White House still found it necessary to obstruct the scheduled release 
of the remaining pages, which contained mainly notes from meetings and internal White House 
memos.250 However, a little journey back in history shows that a couple of high-ranking officials 
from the current administration, such as Richard Cheney and Donald Rumsfeld, also served in 
the Reagan administration, thereby making them the ‘authors’ of the stalled papers. In addition, 
Bush’s own father, George H. W. Bush, held the vice president position during the reign of 
Reagan, a factor which most probably pushed the presidential papers issue even higher on the 
president’s priority list.   
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Since press access in combat zones has been an everlasting issue for both the news media and the 
government, chapter two continued with a comparison of the media coverage in four conflicts 
where the United States had been involved: the Vietnam War, the Persian Gulf War, Afghanistan 
and Iraq. This was done in order to illustrate how Pentagon’s unrestrictive, as well as restrictive 
information policies have affected the work of news reporters out in the field.  
The Vietnam War became a unique case in U.S. history because of several aspects. First, 
reporters were free to move around the country as they wished, and the reason for this was the 
cooperative military administration.251 The fact that reporters were given such free reigns was a 
‘privilege’ that was never granted to the media again, because military officials believed images 
of dead people and destroyed villages resulted in the anti-war movement at home. Second, 
historian John Carlos Rowe argued that the “relegitimation” theory, which treats Vietnam as a 
special case in history “whose mistakes might be “corrected” the next time,” led, and still leads 
to a continuation of justifications for a new war America could fight.252 For instance, the 
“relegitimation” theory was applied in the Persian Gulf War in 1991, where ‘mistakes’ from 
Vietnam were about to get “corrected.” One ‘correction’ implied not granting full liberty to the 
press, and a number of restrictive rules were consequently established. The most known rule 
became the notorious “pool system”, where pools were small groups consisting of selected 
reporters who were escorted on guided tours chosen by the Pentagon.253 In addition, reporters 
had to sign a contract, agreeing that their news stories had to be submitted for a “security review” 
by Pentagon officials before publishing them. Although Mr. Bush Sr. declared that the Vietnam 
syndrome was “kicked…once and for all,” that assertion was disputed by historian Rowe.  
 
As much as journalists were dissatisfied with the work conditions during the Gulf War, their 
experiences were to become insignificant as the first bomb raids began in Afghanistan in October 
2001. With severe restricted access to land and sea bases, and no chance to interview U.S. 
troops, it was frustrating for reporters to produce news stories when there was practically no 
material to work on. This frustration was understandable when the access was free to the 
Alliance troops and even the Taliban.254 Not only did the Defense Department impose tough 
rules out in the terrain, but Rumsfeld even issued a directive, where he instructed all Pentagon’s 
officials not to make statements about military actions.255  
70 
 
 
With the Iraq war new policies were introduced, the embedding policy being the central one. 
When reporters signed on to be embedded, they were assigned to a specific unit with no 
possibilities to move around freely. Embedding could be viewed as an improvement when 
compared to Afghanistan; however, the mandatory contract journalists signed contained a list of 
prohibitions. In addition, individual unit commanders held significant influence over his or hers 
unit’s coverage, which was made possible through the so-called “security at source” rule.256 
While one Pentagon correspondent stated that the secret, no access- policy in Afghanistan might 
have led to “black holes in history,” Bushell and Cunningham at Columbia Journalism Review 
argued that the censored information stood good chances of getting published in the aftermath in 
media places such as magazines, books and documentaries.257 
 
Despite the occurrences of scrutiny attacks, criticism and ‘secret’ behavior between the 
administration and reporters, some forces in the national news media have started to analyze 
themselves and their actions. The final chapter focused therefore on the discussion where some 
journalists argued that the Fourth Estate failed to fulfill its duties, especially in the lead up to the 
invasion of Iraq in 2003. The FAIR media watch group maintained that many journalists treated 
the administration’s arguments as though they were facts, exemplified through the State of the 
Union address in 2002 and Colin Powell’s presentation at the U.N. Security Council. A journey 
through recent history of professional journalism revealed that corporate take-over of the news 
media, commercial pressures, and restructuring were all factors that left investigative journalism 
and international correspondence in a poor condition. In 2004, national giants such as the New 
York Times and the Washington Post apologized to their readers for not conducting better 
research of the administration’s arguments, and for not placing enough critical stories on their 
front pages.   
 
In the defense of journalists, it was not always simple to check claims and arguments when these 
were based on classified intelligence data or national security reasons. It was not always easy for 
reporters to break through the administration’s wall of secrecy. However, the self-reflections and 
apologies could have perhaps been avoided if only a small dose of skepticism was retained in the 
first place.  
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In the end, it is important to point out that not every member of the media failed. We have seen 
that brave reporters such as Dana Milbank, Thomas Ricks and a number of others dared to 
criticize and challenge the president and his administration’s arguments in the tense atmosphere 
after 9/11. We have seen that the staff at the VOA dared to challenge its employer and air an 
interview with one of America’s worst enemies. Despite the risk of consequences, these news 
media individuals attempted to fulfill the Fourth Estate’s function: being society’s “watchdog.” 
 
Possible Solutions 
In order for the relationship to improve between the White House and the American press, 
changes need to take place in both camps. When the press is concerned, there are several issues it 
could work on. First, it needs to gain back skepticism. As has been illustrated throughout the 
thesis, there was little or no sign of skepticism in the mainstream media in the post-9/11 period. 
The administration’s anti-terrorism policies and the Iraq arguments were generally reported but 
not challenged. The “he said/she said” approach should be avoided in the future since it is a mere 
stenographic approach that fails to provide a full background analysis to the readers and viewers. 
Second, the press needs to improve its verification methods. As witnessed in the Judith Miller 
case, relying on one allegedly reliable source resulted in massive inaccurate reporting. Therefore, 
sources and their veracity need to be thoroughly examined in order for news stories to be as 
credible as possible. Third, the reliance on Washington political circles must decrease in scope. 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, Washington officials are often preferred over other actors, 
which results in an unbalanced and unequal presentation of news. The fourth solution the media 
should attempt to achieve is independence. Reporters and editors must dare to break from the 
mainstream “pack” and focus on working toward the public’s advantage. Therefore, commercial 
and financial interests should be placed further down on the priority list. Although the latter 
process might seem too problematic to implement- considering the fact that powerful 
corporations are increasingly dominating the information industry- the media ought to remind 
themselves that one of their missions is to serve the public, and not themselves.  
 
The White House, on the other hand, needs to analyze itself and its treatment of the media, and 
above all, it needs to embrace the role and function of the Fourth Estate. The media are not there 
to only report the news, but to ‘guard’ society and hold government officials accountable. As 
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illustrated in the thesis, the Bush administration clearly refused to accept the role of the media 
when it declared that they had no “check-and-balance function.” Instead, it put up a wall of 
secrecy and responded with scrutiny attacks when journalists attempted to break through that 
wall of secrecy. Restrictive press policies were imposed even during wartimes, leaving reporters 
with not many alternative options but to sign Pentagon’s contract and accept the rules of the 
game. As a result, the American public was left with little information in the crucial post-9/11 
period, which was a time when the nation should have been provided with facts so that it could 
make up its own opinion. At that point, both the press and the president failed the American 
people. And they failed American democracy.   
 
In order for the same mistakes not to occur again, the White House should consider initiating a 
transparency process, where openness and honesty would replace secrecy and scrutiny. Perhaps 
it sounds naive, but a transparency process would help the next administration restore its 
integrity and regain the public’s, as well as the media’s, trust. However, whether some of the 
proposed solutions will be implemented remains to wait and see. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
73 
 
 
74 
 
 
                                                          
Notes 
 
 
Introduction 
1 “Some Critical Voices Face Censorship,” Fairness & Accuracy in Reporting, 3 April 2003, 
<http://www.fair.org/index.php?page=1825> (14 Jan. 2008). 
2   Dadge, Casualty of War, 144-145. 
3  The War in Iraq, 26. 
4 Richard Davis, The Press and American Politics: The New Mediator (New York& London: Longman, 1992), 118. 
5 David Dadge, The War in Iraq and Why the Media Failed Us (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger, 2006), 46. 
6 Dadge, The War in Iraq and Why the Media Failed Us, 46. 
7 John W. Dean, Worse than Watergate: The Secret Presidency of George W. Bush (New York: Little, Brown and 
Company, 2004) preface. 
8 David E. Sanger, “In Early Battles, Bush Learns Need for Compromises,” NewYorkTimes.com, 29 April 2001, 
<http://query.nytimes.com/search> (14 Feb. 2008). 
9 Sanger, “In Early Battles, Bush Learns Need for Compromises.” 
10 Sanger, “In Early Battles, Bush Learns Need for Compromises.” 
11 Matthew Eshbaugh-Soha, “Presidential Press Conferences over Time,” American Journal of Political Science 
47.2 (2003): 348-349, online via JSTOR, <http://www.jstor.org/search> (13 Feb. 2008). 
12 “Another Question, Mr. President?” Editorial, WashingtonPost.com, 9 Mar. 2003, 
<http://www.washingtonpost.com> (23 Sept. 2007). 
13 Dadge, The War in Iraq, 29. 
14 David Dadge, Casualty of War: The Bush Administration’s Assault on a Free Press (New York: Prometheus 
Books, 2004), 106-107. 
15 The War in Iraq, 25. 
16 Dadge, Casualty of War, 30-34. 
17   The War in Iraq, 33. 
18 Jim Rutenberg, “White House Keeps a Grip on Its News,” NewYorkTimes.com, 14 Oct. 2002, 
<http://query.nytimes.com/search> (14 Feb. 2008). 
19 Rutenberg, “White House Keeps a Grip on Its News.” 
20 Rutenberg, “White House Keeps a Grip on Its News.” 
21 The War in Iraq, 37. 
22 Joseph A. Pika and John Anthony Maltese, The Politics of the Presidency, 6th ed. (Washington D.C.: CQ Press, 
2006), 95. 
23 The White House, “New White House Office Coordinates Global Communications,” News Release, 21 Jan. 
2003, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/01/> (20 Feb. 2008). 
24 Elizabeth Becker, “A Nation Challenged: Hearts and Minds- In the War on Terrorism, A Battle to Shape 
Opinion,” NewYorkTimes.com, 11 Nov. 2001, <http://query.nytimes.com/search> (10 Oct. 2007). 
25 The White House, “President Signs Anti-Terrorism Bill,” News Release, 26 Oct. 2001, 
<http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/10/> (13 Feb. 2008). 
26 Pika and Maltese, The Politics of the Presidency, 403. 
27 The White House, “Title I- Department of Homeland Security,” Bill Release, 
<http://www.whitehouse.gov/deptofhomeland/bill/title1.html> (20 Feb. 2008). 
28 The Politics of the Presidency, 215. 
75 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
 
Chapter 1 
___________________________ 
29 Mark J. Rozell, “The Press and the Presidency,” in Understanding the Presidency, 3rd ed., ed. James P. Pfiffner 
and Roger H. Davidson (New York: Pearson Longman, 2005), 137. 
30 Rozell in Understanding the Presidency, 137. 
31 Rozell in Understanding the Presidency, 137. 
32 Rozell in Understanding the Presidency, 138. 
33 John Anthony Maltese, Spin Control: The White House Office of Communications and the Management of 
Presidential News (Chapel Hill& London: The University of North Carolina Press, 1992), 9. 
34 Dadge, The War in Iraq, 32. 
35 Understanding the Presidency, 139. 
36 Rozell in Understanding the Presidency, 139. 
37  Maltese, Spin Control, 10. 
38 Maltese, Spin Control, 42. 
39 Maltese, Spin Control, 3. 
40 Pika and Maltese, The Politics of the Presidency, 110. 
41 Pika and Maltese, The Politics of the Presidency, 147. 
42 Spin Control, 3. 
43 The Politics of the Presidency, 106. 
44  The Politics of the Presidency, 107. 
45 Casualty of War, 106. 
46 Casualty of War, 106. 
47 “Maher Apologizes for Cowardly Remark,” ABCNews.com, 20 Sept. 2001, <http://abcnews.go.com> (23 Sept. 
2007). 
48 Casualty of War, 107. 
49 The White House, Ari Fleischer, Press Briefing, 26 Sept. 2001, 
<http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09> (27 Sept. 2007). 
50 Maureen Dowd, “We Love the Liberties They Hate,” NewYorkTimes.com, 30 Sept. 2001, 
<http://query.nytimes.com/search> (10 Oct. 2007). 
51 Dowd, “We Love the Liberties They Hate.” 
52 “VOA Charter,” Voice of America, <http://www.voanews.com/english/about/VOACharter.cfm> (6 Dec. 2007). 
53 “Restructuring US International Broadcasting in the 1990s,” Voice of America, <http://www.voanews.com> (6 
Dec. 2007). 
54 Casualty of War, 30. 
55 Ellen Nakashima, “Broadcast with Afghan Leader Halted,” WashingtonPost.com, 23 Sept. 2001, 
<http://www.washingtonpost.com> (6 Dec. 2007). 
56 U.S. Department of State, Richard Boucher, Daily Press Briefing, 24 Sept. 2001, 
<http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2001> (7 Dec. 2007).  
57 U.S. Department of State, Richard Boucher, Daily Press Briefing, 24 Sept. 2001. 
58 U.S. Department of State, Richard Boucher, Daily Press Briefing, 24 Sept. 2001. 
59 Nakashima, “Broadcast with Afghan Leader Halted.”  
60 Casualty of War, 32. 
61 Casualty of War, 34. 
62 “Bush Visits VOA,” Voice of America, 26 Feb. 2002, <http://www.voanews.com/english/archive> (6 Dec. 2007).  
63  Nakashima, “Broadcast with Afghan Leader Halted.” 
76 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
64 The War in Iraq, 25. 
65 Bryan Keefer, “Dana Milbank on Covering the White House and Nicknames We Can’t Publish,” Columbia 
Journalism Review, 20 Feb. 2004, <http://www.cjr.org/the_water_cooler/dana_milbank_on_covering_the_w.php> 
(10 Dec. 2007).  
66 Dana Milbank, “For Bush, Facts Are Malleable,” WashingtonPost.com, 22 Oct. 2002, 
<http://www.washingtonpost.com> (25 Nov. 2007). 
67 Milbank, “For Bush, Facts Are Malleable.” 
68 The War in Iraq, 26. 
69 The War in Iraq  26. 
70 Thomas E. Ricks, “War Plan for Iraq Largely in Place,” WashingtonPost.com, 2 Mar. 2003, 
<http://www.washingtonpost.com> (20 Nov. 2007). 
71 The War in Iraq, 27. 
72 The War in Iraq, 27. 
73 Casualty of War, 108. 
74 Casualty of War, 109. 
75 Casualty of War, 109. 
76 Tom Gutting, “Bush Has Failed to Lead U.S.,” Double Standards, 22 Sept. 2001, 
<http://www.doublestandards.org/gutting1.html> (5 Jan. 2008).  
77 Gutting, “Bush Has Failed to Lead U.S.”. 
78 Casualty of War, 109. 
79 Tom Gutting, “Censoring Dissenting Voices Is a Danger to Us All,” Double Standards, 5 Oct. 2001, 
<http://www.doublestandards.org/gutting1.html> (5 Jan. 2008). 
80 The War in Iraq, 55. 
81 The War in Iraq, 55. 
82 U.S. Department of Defense, Address at the 88th Annual American Legion National Convention, Speech 
Transcript, 29 Aug. 2006, <http://www.defenselink.mil/Speeches/Speech.aspx?SpeechID=1033> (24 April 2008). 
83 U.S. Department of Defense, Address at the 88th Annual American Legion National Convention, Speech 
Transcript, 29 Aug. 2006, <http://www.defenselink.mil/Speeches/Speech.aspx?SpeechID=1033> (24 April 2008). 
84 “Some Critical Voices Face Censorship,” Fairness & Accuracy in Reporting, 3 April 2003, 
<http://www.fair.org/index.php?page=1825> (14 Jan. 2008). 
85 The War in Iraq, 66. 
86 “Some Critical Voices Face Censorship,” Fairness & Accuracy in Reporting, 3 April 2003. 
87 Hal Bernton and Ray Rivera, “Air Force adds to controversy with its own coffin photos,” Seattle Times, 23 April 
2004, <http://archives.seattletimes.nwsource.com> (14 Nov. 2007).  
88 Hal Bernton and Ray Rivera, “How two women, one photo stirred national debate,” Seattle Times, 25 April 2004, 
<http://archives.seattletimes.nwsource.com> (14 Nov. 2007). 
89 Bernton and Rivera, “How two women, one photo stirred national debate”. 
90 Bernton and Rivera, “How two women, one photo stirred national debate”. 
91 Bernton and Rivera, “Air Force adds to controversy with its own coffin photos”. 
92 Mark Benjamin, “The Invisible wounded,” Salon.com, 8 Mar. 2005, 
<http://archive.salon.com/news/feature/2005/03/08/night_flights> (24 April 2008). 
93 Alessandra Stanley, “A Nation Challenged: The Media- Opponents of the War Are Scarce on Television,” 
NewYorkTimes.com, 9 Nov. 2001, <http://query.nytimes.com/search> (23 Sept. 2007). 
 
 
 
 
77 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Chapter 2 
_______________________ 
94 Dean, Worse than Watergate, 69. 
95 James P. Pfiffner, “Assessing the Bush Presidency,” in Considering the Bush Presidency, ed. Gary L. Gregg II 
and Mark J. Rozell (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 7. 
96 Pfiffner in Considering the Bush Presidency, 7. 
97 Pfiffner in Considering the Bush Presidency, 7. 
98 Worse than Watergate, 61. 
99 Worse than Watergate, 61. 
100 Eric Alterman, “Bush’s War on the Press,” The Nation, 9 May 2005, 
<http://www.thenation.com/doc/20050509/alterman> (12 Nov. 2007). 
101 Alterman, “Bush’s War on the Press.” 
102 Mike Allen, “Hughes Keeps White House in Line,” WashingtonPost.com, 19 Mar. 2001, 
<http://www.washingtonpost.com> (24 Feb. 2008). 
103 Allen, “Hughes Keeps White House in Line.” 
104 “A Man Alone: The Twilight of the Bush Presidency,” Independent.co.uk, 29 Aug. 2007, 
<http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/politics/a-man-alone-the-twilight-of-the-bush-presidency-463421.html> 
(27 Apr. 2008). 
105 Casualty of War, 147- 148. 
106 Casualty of War, 148. 
107 Bruce Shapiro, “Information Lockdown,” The Nation, 12 Nov. 2001, 
<http://www.thenation.com/doc/20011112/shapiro> (6 Dec. 2007). 
108 Casualty of War, 149. 
109 Casualty of War, 149. 
110 Casualty of War, 149. 
111 William J. Broad, “A Nation Challenged- Domestic Security: U.S. Is Tightening Rules on Keeping Scientific 
Secrets,” NewYorkTimes.com, 17 Feb. 2002, <http://www.query.nytimes.com> (6 Dec. 2007). 
112 Broad, “A Nation Challenged- Domestic Security: U.S. Is Tightening Rules on Keeping Scientific Secrets.” 
113 The White House, “President Signs Anti-Terrorism Bill,” Executive Order, 26 Oct. 2001, 
<http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/10/> (13 Feb. 2008). 
114 Pfiffner in Considering the Bush Presidency, 7. 
115 Worse than Watergate, 128. 
116 Worse than Watergate, 129. 
117 Worse than Watergate, 130. 
118  Victor Navasky, foreword in Journalism after September 11, ed. Barbie Zelizer and Stuart Allan (London and 
New York: Routledge, 2002), xvii. 
119 “Ashcroft: Critics of new terror measures undermine effort,” CNN.com, 7 Dec. 2001, 
<http://archives.cnn.com/2001/US/12/06/inv.ashcroft.hearing/> (28 Apr. 2008). 
120 Jacob Weisberg, “Ashcroft Deconstructed,” Slate.com, 7 Dec. 2001, <http://slate.msn.com/?id=2059538> (28 
Apr. 2008). 
121 The White House, “Title I- Department of Homeland Security,” Bill Release, 
<http://www.whitehouse.gov/deptofhomeland/bill/title1.html> (20 Feb. 2008). 
122 The White House, “President Bush Signs Homeland Security Act,” Executive Order, 25 Nov. 2002, 
<http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/11/> (5 Mar. 2008). 
123 The Politics of the Presidency, 215. 
124 Kathryn Dunn Tenpas and Stephen Hess, “Organizing the Bush Presidency,” in Considering the Bush 
Presidency, ed. Gary L. Gregg II and Mark J. Rozell (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 44. 
78 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
125 Tenpas and Hess in Considering the Bush Presidency, 44. 
126 The Politics of the Presidency, 217. 
127 The Politics of the Presidency, 217. 
128 The War in Iraq, 38. 
129 Mark Tapscott, “Too Many Secrets,” WashingtonPost.com, 20 Nov. 2002, <http://www.washingtonpost.com> 
(28. Apr. 2008). 
130 Tapscott, “Too Many Secrets.” 
131 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Title II- Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection,” 25 Nov. 
2002, <http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/hr_5005_enr.pdf> (28 Apr. 2008). 
132 National Archives, “Presidential Records Act (PRA) of 1978,” <http://www.archives.gov/presidential-
libraries/laws/1978-act.html> (2 Mar. 2008). 
133 Worse than Watergate, 90. 
134 Russ Baker, “What Are They Hiding?” The Nation, 25 Feb. 2002, 
<http://www.thenation.com/doc/20020225/baker> (6 Dec. 2007). 
135 Baker, “What Are They Hiding?” 
136 Baker, “What Are They Hiding?” 
137 Baker, “What Are They Hiding?” 
138 Worse than Watergate, 91. 
139 Baker, “What Are They Hiding?” 
140 The White House, Ari Fleischer, Press Briefing, 1 Nov. 2001, 
<http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/11> (12 Dec. 2007). 
141 Steve Hansen, “SAA Responds to Executive Order 13233 on Presidential Papers,” Society of American 
Archivists, <http://www.archivists.org/statements/stephenhorn.asp> (3 Mar. 2008). 
142 “The Haunted Archives,” Editorial, The Nation, 3 May 2004, <http://www.thenation.com/doc/20040503/editors> 
(6 Dec. 2007). 
143 Jon Wiener, “The Archives and Allen Weinstein,” The Nation, 17 May 2004, 
<http://www.thenation.com/doc/20040517/wiener> (6 Dec. 2007). 
144 Wiener, “The Archives and Allen Weinstein.” 
145 Wiener, “The Archives and Allen Weinstein.” 
146 “The Haunted Archives,” Editorial. 
147 Linton Weeks, “Guarding the Past: The Archivist’s Mild Manner Belies the Uproar Over His New Job,” 
WashingtonPost.com, 31 Mar. 2005, < http://www.washingtonpost.com> (5 Mar. 2008). 
148 Weeks, “Guarding the Past: The Archivist’s Mild Manner Belies the Uproar Over His New Job.” 
149 Davis, The Press and American Politics, 225. 
150 Davis, The Press and American Politics, 225. 
151 Elizabeth Becker, “A Nation Challenged: Hearts and Minds- In the War on Terrorism, A Battle to Shape 
Opinion,” NewYorkTimes.com, 11 Nov. 2001, <http://query.nytimes.com/search> (10 Oct. 2007). 
152 Robert W. McChesney, “September 11 and the Structural Limitations of US Journalism,” in Journalism after 
September 11, ed. Barbie Zelizer and Stuart Allan (London and New York: Routledge, 2002), 98. 
153 John Carlos Rowe, “The “Vietnam Effect” in the Persian Gulf War,” Cultural Critique no. 19 (1991): 121- 139, 
online via JSTOR, <http://www.jstor.org> (5 Nov. 2007). 
154 Margot Norris, “Military Censorship and the Body Count in the Persian Gulf War,” Cultural Critique no. 19 
(1991): 223- 245, online via JSTOR, <http://www.jstor.org> (15 Nov. 2007). 
155 James LeMoyne, “A Correspondent’s Tale; Pentagon’s Strategy for the Press: Good News or No News,” 
NewYorkTimes.com, 17 Feb. 1991, <http://query.nytimes.com/search> (19 Nov. 2007). 
156 Norris, “Military Censorship and the Body Count in the Persian Gulf War,” 226. 
157 Norris, “Military Censorship and the Body Count in the Persian Gulf War,” 229. 
158 Norris, “Military Censorship and the Body Count in the Persian Gulf War,” 237. 
159 Norris, “Military Censorship and the Body Count in the Persian Gulf War,” 237. 
160 Norman Solomon, “Beyond the “Vietnam Syndrome,”” Fairness & Accuracy in Reporting, 13 Sept. 2005, 
<http://www.fair.org/index.php?page=2663> (21 Nov. 2007).  
161 Rowe, “The “Vietnam Effect” in the Persian Gulf War,” 128. 
162 Casualty of War, 77-78. 
163 Rowe, “The “Vietnam Effect” in the Persian Gulf War,” 126. 
79 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
164 Howard Kurtz, “Journalists Worry About Limits on Information, Access,” WashingtonPost.com, 24 Sept. 2001, 
<http://www.washingtonpost.com> (10 Oct. 2007). 
165 Kurtz, “Journalists Worry About Limits on Information, Access.” 
166 Neil Hickey, “Afghanistan and Beyond: Access Denied- The Pentagon’s War Reporting Rules are the Toughest 
Ever,” Columbia Journalism Review no. 1 (2002), <http://cjrachives.org/issues/2002/1/afghan-hickey.asp> (13 Feb. 
2008). 
167 Hickey, “Afghanistan and Beyond: Access Denied- The Pentagon’s War Reporting Rules are the Toughest 
Ever.” 
168 Hickey, “Afghanistan and Beyond: Access Denied- The Pentagon’s War Reporting Rules are the Toughest 
Ever.” 
169 Hickey, “Afghanistan and Beyond: Access Denied- The Pentagon’s War Reporting Rules are the Toughest 
Ever.” 
170 Andrew Bushell and Brent Cunningham, “The Road to War: Being There- Suddenly the Pentagon Grants Access 
to the Action, but the Devil’s in the Details,” Columbia Journalism Review no. 2 (2003), 
<http://cjrarchives.org/issues/2003/2/pentagon-bushell.asp> (12 Nov. 2007). 
171 Bushell and Cunningham, “The Road to War: Being There- Suddenly the Pentagon Grants Access to the Action, 
but the Devil’s in the Details.” 
172 Bushell and Cunningham, “The Road to War: Being There- Suddenly the Pentagon Grants Access to the Action, 
but the Devil’s in the Details.” 
173 Bushell and Cunningham, “The Road to War: Being There- Suddenly the Pentagon Grants Access to the Action, 
but the Devil’s in the Details.” 
174 Paul Friedman, “The Real- Time War- TV: A Missed Opportunity,” Columbia Journalism Review no. 3 (2003), 
<http://backissues.cjrarchives.org/year/03/3/friedman.asp> (19 Nov. 2007). 
175 Kenneth T. Walsh, “What’s Behind Bush’s Vietnam- Iraq Analogy,” CBSNews.com, 24 Aug. 2007, 
<http://www.cbsnews.com> (8 Nov. 2007). 
176 Brian Frederking, “Constructing Post-Cold War Collective Security,” The American Political Science Review 97, 
no. 3 (2003): 376- 377, online via JSTOR, <http://www.jstor.org> (5 Nov. 2007). 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 3 
________________________ 
177 The White House, “President Delivers State of the Union Address,” News Release, 29 Jan. 2002, 
<http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/01/> (26 Mar. 2008). 
178 The White House, “President Delivers State of the Union Address,” News Release, 29 Jan. 2002, 
<http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/01/> (26 Mar. 2008). 
179 Bennett et al., When the Press Fails: Political Power and the News Media from Iraq to Katrina (Chicago& 
London: The University of Chicago Press, 2007), 18. 
180 Douglas Kellner, Media Spectacle and the Crisis of Democracy: Terrorism, War and Election Battles (Boulder& 
London: Paradigm Publishers, 2005), 49. 
181 Kellner, Media Spectacle and the Crisis of Democracy, 51. 
182 U.S. Department of Defense, Secretary Rumsfeld interview with Jim Lehrer, News Transcript, 19 Sept. 2002, 
<http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=3656> (26 Mar. 2008). 
183 Bennett et al., When the Press Fails, 22. 
184 Kellner, Media Spectacle and the Crisis of Democracy, 60. 
185 “A Failure of Skepticism in Powell Coverage,” Fairness & Accuracy in Reporting, 10 Feb. 2003, 
<http://www.fair.org/index.php?page=1846> (12 Dec. 2007). 
186 “A Failure of Skepticism in Powell Coverage,” Fairness & Accuracy in Reporting. 
187 “A Failure of Skepticism in Powell Coverage,” Fairness & Accuracy in Reporting. 
188 John Nichols and Robert W. McChesney, Tragedy and Farce: How the American Media Sell Wars, Spin 
Elections, and Destroy Democracy (New York& London: The New Press, 2005), 5. 
189 Bennett et al., When the Press Fails, 170. 
190 Dadge, The War in Iraq, 8-9.  
80 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
191 Dadge’s The War in Iraq describes the threefold process over several pages, 11-18. 
192 James W. Carey, “American Journalism On, Before, and After September 11,” in Journalism after September 11, 
ed. Barbie Zelizer and Stuart Allan (London and New York: Routledge, 2002), 83. 
193 Carey in Journalism after September 11, 84. 
194 Carey in Journalism after September 11, 85. 
195 Pauline Maier et al., Inventing America: A History of the United States (New York& London: W. W. Norton& 
Company, 2003), 1017. 
196 Carey in Journalism after September 11, 85. 
197 Carey in Journalism after September 11, 86. 
198 Nichols and McChesney, Tragedy and Farce, 24. 
199 Carey in Journalism after September 11, 86. 
200 Carey in Journalism after September 11, 77. 
201 Nichols and McChesney, Tragedy and Farce, 23. 
202 Nichols and McChesney, Tragedy and Farce, 23. 
203 Nichols and McChesney, Tragedy and Farce, 29. 
204 Pauline Maier et al., Inventing America: A History of the United States, 1019. 
205 David Barstow, “Message Machine: Behind Analysts, the Pentagon’s Hidden Hand,” NewYorkTimes.com, 20 
April, 2008, <http://query.nytimes.com/search> (21 Apr. 2008). 
206 Barstow, “Message Machine: Behind Analysts, the Pentagon’s Hidden Hand.” 
207 Barstow, “Message Machine: Behind Analysts, the Pentagon’s Hidden Hand.” 
208 Barstow, “Message Machine: Behind Analysts, the Pentagon’s Hidden Hand.” 
209 Barstow, “Message Machine: Behind Analysts, the Pentagon’s Hidden Hand.” 
210 Barstow, “Message Machine: Behind Analysts, the Pentagon’s Hidden Hand.” 
211 Barstow, “Message Machine: Behind Analysts, the Pentagon’s Hidden Hand.” 
212 Barstow, “Message Machine: Behind Analysts, the Pentagon’s Hidden Hand.” 
213 Robert W. McChesney, “September 11 and the Structural Limitations of US Journalism,” in Journalism after 
September 11, ed. Barbie Zelizer and Stuart Allan (London and New York: Routledge, 2002), 93-94. 
214 McChesney in Journalism after September 11, 94. 
215 Media Spectacle and the Crisis of Democracy, 48. 
216 John R. Macarthur, “Voices: The Lies We Bought- The Unchallenged “Evidence” for War,” Columbia 
Journalism Review no. 3 (2003), <http://cjrarchives.org/issues/2003/3/lies-macarthur.asp> (28 Feb. 2008). 
217 Macarthur, “Voices: The Lies We Bought- The Unchallenged “Evidence” for War”. 
218 “From the Editors; The Times and Iraq,” Editorial, NewYorkTimes.com, 26 May, 2004, 
<http://query.nytimes.com/search> (21 Nov. 2007).  
219 “From the Editors; The Times and Iraq,” Editorial. 
220 “From the Editors; The Times and Iraq,” Editorial. 
221 Bennett et al., When the Press Fails, 37. 
222 Bennett et al., When the Press Fails, 37. 
223 Bennett et al., When the Press Fails, 37. 
224 Dadge, The War in Iraq, 117. 
225 Howard Kurtz, “New Republic Editors ‘Regret’ Their Support of Iraq War,” WashingtonPost.com, 19 June 2004, 
<http://www.washingtonpost.com> (16 Dec. 2007). 
226 Kurtz, “New Republic Editors ‘Regret’ Their Support of Iraq War.” 
227 Kurtz, “New Republic Editors ‘Regret’ Their Support of Iraq War.” 
228 Kurtz, “New Republic Editors ‘Regret’ Their Support of Iraq War.” 
229 Howard Kurtz, “The Post on WMDs: An Inside Story; Prewar Articles Questioning Threat Often Didn’t Make 
Front Page,” WashingtonPost.com, 12 Aug. 2004, <http://www.washingtonpost.com> (8 Apr. 2008). 
230 Kurtz, “The Post on WMDs.” 
231 Kurtz, “The Post on WMDs.” 
232 Kurtz, “The Post on WMDs.” 
233 Kurtz, “The Post on WMDs.” 
234 Bennett et al., When the Press Fails, 37. 
235 Bennett et al., When the Press Fails, 29. 
236 Bennett et al., When the Press Fails, 190. 
237 Bennett et al., When the Press Fails, 191. 
81 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
238 Bennett et al., When the Press Fails, 195. 
 
 
Conclusion  
____________________________ 
239 The White House, Ari Fleischer, Press Briefing, 26 Sept. 2001, 
<http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09> (27 Sept. 2007). 
240 Dowd, “We Love the Liberties They Hate.” 
241 Dadge, Casualty of War, 30-34. 
242 Nakashima, “Broadcast with Afghan Leader Halted.” 
243 Casualty of War, 108-109.  
244 The War in Iraq, 55.  
245 “Blast kills 4, raising U.S. toll in Iraq to 4,000,” CNN.com, 24 Mar. 2008, 
<http://edition.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/meast/03/23/iraq.main/index.html> (4 May, 2008). 
246 Pfiffner in Considering the Bush Presidency, 7. 
247 Worse than Watergate, 129-130. 
248 The War in Iraq, 38. 
249 Tapscott, “Too Many Secrets.” 
250 Worse than Watergate, 90. 
251 Davis, The Press and American Politics, 225. 
252 John Carlos Rowe, “The “Vietnam Effect” in the Persian Gulf War,” Cultural Critique no. 19 (1991): 121- 139, 
online via JSTOR, <http://www.jstor.org> (5 Nov. 2007). 
253 James LeMoyne, “A Correspondent’s Tale; Pentagon’s Strategy for the Press: Good News or No News,” 
NewYorkTimes.com, 17 Feb. 1991, <http://query.nytimes.com/search> (19 Nov. 2007). 
254 Hickey, “Afghanistan and Beyond: Access Denied- The Pentagon’s War Reporting Rules are the Toughest 
Ever.” 
255 Hickey, “Afghanistan and Beyond: Access Denied- The Pentagon’s War Reporting Rules are the Toughest 
Ever.” 
256 Bushell and Cunningham, “The Road to War: Being There- Suddenly the Pentagon Grants Access to the Action, 
but the Devil’s in the Details.” 
257 Bushell and Cunningham, “The Road to War: Being There- Suddenly the Pentagon Grants Access to the Action, 
but the Devil’s in the Details.” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
82 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Works Cited 
 
 
Books  
 
Bennett, W. Lance, Regina G. Lawrence, and Steven Livingston. When the Press Fails: Political 
Power and the News Media from Iraq to Katrina. Chicago& London: The University of Chicago 
Press, 2007.  
 
Carey, James W. “American Journalism On, Before, and After September 11.” In Journalism 
after September 11, edited by Barbie Zelizer and Stuart Allan. London and New York: 
Routledge, 2002. 
 
Dadge, David. Casualty of War: The Bush Administration’s Assault on a Free Press. New York: 
Prometheus Books, 2004. 
---. The War in Iraq and Why the Media Failed Us. Westport, Connecticut: Praeger, 2006. 
 
Davis, Richard. The Press and American Politics: The New Mediator. New York& London: 
Longman, 1992. 
 
Dean, John W. Worse than Watergate: The Secret Presidency of George W. Bush. New York: 
Little, Brown and Company, 2004. 
 
Kellner, Douglas. Media Spectacle and the Crisis of Democracy: Terrorism, War, and Election 
Battles. Boulder& London: Paradigm Publishers, 2005. 
 
Maier, Pauline, Merritt Roe Smith, Alexander Keyssar, and Daniel J. Kevles. Inventing America: 
A History of the United States. New York& London: W.W. Norton& Company, 2003. 
 
Maltese, John Anthony. Spin Control: The White House Office of Communications and the 
Management of Presidential News. Chapel Hill& London: The University of North Carolina 
Press, 1992. 
 
McChesney, Robert W. “September 11 and the Structural Limitations of US Journalism.” In 
Journalism after September 11, edited by Barbie Zelizer and Stuart Allan. London and New 
York: Routledge, 2002. 
 
Navasky, Victor. Foreword. In Journalism after September 11, edited by Barbie Zelizer and 
Stuart Allan. London and New York: Routledge, 2002. 
 
Nichols, John, and Robert W. McChesney. Tragedy and Farce: How the American Media Sell 
Wars, Spin Elections, and Destroy Democracy. New York: The New Press, 2005. 
 
83 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Pfiffner, James P. “Assessing the Bush Presidency.” In Considering the Bush Presidency, edited 
by Gary L. Gregg II and Mark J. Rozell. New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004. 
 
Pika, Joseph A., and John Anthony Maltese. The Politics of the Presidency. 6th ed. Washington 
D.C.: CQ Press, 2006.  
 
Rozell, Mark. “The Press and the Presidency.” In Understanding the Presidency, 3rd ed., edited 
by James P. Pfiffner and Roger H. Davidson. New York: Pearson Longman, 2005. 
 
Tenpas, Kathryn Dunn, and Stephen Hess. “Organizing the Bush Presidency.” In Considering 
the Bush Presidency, edited by Gary L. Gregg II and Mark J. Rozell. New York and Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2004. 
 
 
 
Electronic Corpora 
 
“A Failure of Skepticism in Powell Coverage.” Fairness & Accuracy in Reporting. 10 Feb. 2003. 
<http://www.fair.org/index.php?page=1846> (12 Dec. 2007). 
 
“A Man Alone: The Twilight of the Bush Presidency.” Independent.co.uk. 29 Aug. 2007. 
<http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/politics/a-man-alone-the-twilight-of-the-bush-
presidency-463421.html> (27 Apr. 2008). 
 
Allen, Mike. “Hughes Keeps White House in Line.” WashingtonPost.com. 19 Mar. 2001. 
<http://www.washingtonpost.com> (24 Feb. 2008). 
 
Alterman, Eric. “Bush’s War on the Press.” The Nation. 9 May 2005. 
<http://www.thenation.com/doc/20050509/alterman> (12 Nov. 2007). 
 
“Another Question, Mr. President?” Editorial. WashingtonPost.com. 9 Mar. 2003. 
<http://www.washingtonpost.com> (23 Sept. 2007). 
 
“Ashcroft: Critics of new terror measures undermine effort.” CNN.com. 7 Dec. 2001. 
<http://archives.cnn.com/2001/US/12/06/inv.ashcroft.hearing/> (28 Apr. 2008). 
 
Baker, Russ. “What Are They Hiding?” The Nation. 25 Feb. 2002. 
<http://www.thenation.com/doc/20020225/baker> (6 Dec. 2007). 
 
Barstow, David. “Message Machine: Behind Analysts, the Pentagon’s Hidden Hand.” 
NewYorkTimes.com. 20 April, 2008. <http://query.nytimes.com/search> (21 Apr. 2008). 
 
Becker, Elizabeth. “A Nation Challenged: Hearts and Minds- In the War on Terrorism, A Battle 
to Shape Opinion.” NewYorkTimes.com. 11 Nov. 2001. <http://query.nytimes.com/search> (10 
Oct. 2007). 
84 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
 
Benjamin, Mark. “The Invisible wounded.” Salon.com. 8 Mar. 2005. 
<http://archive.salon.com/news/feature/2005/03/08/night_flights> (24 April 2008). 
 
Bernton, Hal, and Ray Rivera. “Air Force adds to controversy with its own coffin photos.” 
Seattle Times. 23 April 2004. <http://archives.seattletimes.nwsource.com> (14 Nov. 2007).  
 
Bernton, Hal, and Ray Rivera. “How two women, one photo stirred national debate.” Seattle 
Times. 25 April 2004. <http://archives.seattletimes.nwsource.com> (14 Nov. 2007). 
 
“Blast kills 4, raising U.S. toll in Iraq to 4,000.” CNN.com. 24 Mar. 2008. 
<http://edition.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/meast/03/23/iraq.main/index.html> (4 May, 2008). 
 
Broad, William J. “A Nation Challenged- Domestic Security: U.S. Is Tightening Rules on 
Keeping Scientific Secrets.” NewYorkTimes.com. 17 Feb. 2002. 
<http://www.query.nytimes.com> (6 Dec. 2007). 
 
“Bush Visits VOA.” Voice of America. 26 Feb. 2002. 
<http://www.voanews.com/english/archive> (6 Dec. 2007).  
 
Bushell, Andrew, and Brent Cunningham. “The Road to War: Being There- Suddenly the 
Pentagon Grants Access to the Action, but the Devil’s in the Details.” Columbia Journalism 
Review no. 2 (2003). <http://cjrarchives.org/issues/2003/2/pentagon-bushell.asp> (12 Nov. 
2007). 
 
Dowd, Maureen. “We Love the Liberties They Hate.” NewYorkTimes.com. 30 Sept. 2001. 
<http://query.nytimes.com/search> (10 Oct. 2007). 
 
Eshbaugh-Soha, Matthew. “Presidential Press Conferences over Time.” American Journal of 
Political Science 47.2 (2003): 348-349. Online via JSTOR. <http://www.jstor.org> (13 Feb. 
2008). 
 
Frederking, Brian. “Constructing Post-Cold War Collective Security.” The American Political 
Science Review 97, no. 3 (2003): 376- 377. Online via JSTOR. <http://www.jstor.org> (5 Nov. 
2007). 
 
Friedman, Paul. “The Real- Time War- TV: A Missed Opportunity.” Columbia Journalism 
Review no. 3 (2003). <http://backissues.cjrarchives.org/year/03/3/friedman.asp> (19 Nov. 2007). 
 
“From the Editors; The Times and Iraq.” Editorial. NewYorkTimes.com. 26 May, 2004. 
<http://query.nytimes.com/search> (21 Nov. 2007). 
 
Gutting, Tom. “Bush Has Failed to Lead U.S.” Double Standards. 22 Sept. 2001. 
<http://www.doublestandards.org/gutting1.html> (5 Jan. 2008). 
 
Gutting, Tom. “Censoring Dissenting Voices Is a Danger to Us All.” Double Standards. 5 Oct. 
2001. <http://www.doublestandards.org/gutting1.html> (5 Jan. 2008). 
85 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
 
Hansen, Steve. “SAA Responds to Executive Order 13233 on Presidential Papers.” Society of 
American Archivists. <http://www.archivists.org/statements/stephenhorn.asp> (3 Mar. 2008). 
 
Hickey, Neil. “Afghanistan and Beyond: Access Denied- The Pentagon’s War Reporting Rules 
are the Toughest Ever.” Columbia Journalism Review no. 1 (2002). 
<http://cjrachives.org/issues/2002/1/afghan-hickey.asp> (13 Feb. 2008). 
 
Keefer, Bryan. “Dana Milbank on Covering the White House and Nicknames We Can’t 
Publish.” Columbia Journalism Review. 20 Feb. 2004. 
<http://www.cjr.org/the_water_cooler/dana_milbank_on_covering_the_w.php> (10 Dec. 2007). 
 
Kurtz, Howard. “Journalists Worry About Limits on Information, Access.” WashingtonPost.com. 
24 Sept. 2001. <http://www.washingtonpost.com> (10 Oct. 2007). 
 
Kurtz, Howard. “New Republic Editors ‘Regret’ Their Support of Iraq War.” 
WashingtonPost.com. 19 June 2004. <http://www.washingtonpost.com> (16 Dec. 2007). 
 
Kurtz, Howard. “The Post on WMDs: An Inside Story; Prewar Articles Questioning Threat 
Often Didn’t Make Front Page.” WashingtonPost.com. 12 Aug. 2004. 
<http://www.washingtonpost.com> (8 Apr. 2008). 
 
LeMoyne, James. “A Correspondent’s Tale; Pentagon’s Strategy for the Press: Good News or 
No News.” NewYorkTimes.com. 17 Feb. 1991. <http://query.nytimes.com/search> (19 Nov. 
2007). 
 
Macarthur, John R. “Voices: The Lies We Bought- The Unchallenged “Evidence” for War.” 
Columbia Journalism Review no. 3 (2003). <http://cjrarchives.org/issues/2003/3/lies-
macarthur.asp> (28 Feb. 2008). 
 
“Maher Apologizes for Cowardly Remark.” ABCNews.com. 20 Sept. 2001. 
<http://abcnews.go.com> (23 Sept. 2007). 
 
Milbank, Dana. “For Bush, Facts Are Malleable.” WashingtonPost.com. 22 Oct. 2002. 
<http://www.washingtonpost.com> (25 Nov. 2007). 
 
Nakashima, Ellen. “Broadcast with Afghan Leader Halted.” WashingtonPost.com. 23 Sept. 2001. 
<http://www.washingtonpost.com> (6 Dec. 2007). 
 
National Archives. “Presidential Records Act (PRA) of 1978.” 
<http://www.archives.gov/presidential-libraries/laws/1978-act.html> (2 Mar. 2008). 
 
Norris, Margot. “Military Censorship and the Body Count in the Persian Gulf War.” Cultural 
Critique no. 19 (1991): 223- 245. Online via JSTOR. <http://www.jstor.org> (15 Nov. 2007). 
 
“Restructuring US International Broadcasting in the 1990s.” Voice of America. 
<http://www.voanews.com> (6 Dec. 2007). 
86 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
 
Ricks, Thomas E. “War Plan for Iraq Largely in Place.” WashingtonPost.com. 2 Mar. 2003. 
<http://www.washingtonpost.com> (20 Nov. 2007). 
 
Rowe, John Carlos. “The “Vietnam Effect” in the Persian Gulf War.” Cultural Critique no. 19 
(1991): 121- 139. Online via JSTOR. <http://www.jstor.org> (5 Nov. 2007). 
 
Rutenberg, Jim. “White House Keeps a Grip on Its News.” NewYorkTimes.com. 14 Oct. 2002. 
<http://query.nytimes.com/search> (14 Feb. 2008). 
 
Sanger, David E. “In Early Battles, Bush Learns Need for Compromises.” NewYorkTimes.com. 
29 April 2001. <http://query.nytimes.com/search> (14 Feb. 2008). 
 
Shapiro, Bruce. “Information Lockdown.” The Nation. 12 Nov. 2001. 
<http://www.thenation.com/doc/20011112/shapiro> (6 Dec. 2007). 
 
Solomon, Norman. “Beyond the “Vietnam Syndrome.”” Fairness & Accuracy in Reporting. 13 
Sept. 2005. <http://www.fair.org/index.php?page=2663> (21 Nov. 2007).  
 
“Some Critical Voices Face Censorship.” Fairness & Accuracy in Reporting. 3 April 2003. 
<http://www.fair.org/index.php?page=1825> (14 Jan. 2008). 
 
Stanley, Alessandra. “A Nation Challenged: The Media- Opponents of the War Are Scarce on 
Television.” NewYorkTimes.com. 9 Nov. 2001. <http://query.nytimes.com/search> (23 Sept. 
2007). 
 
Tapscott, Mark. “Too Many Secrets.” WashingtonPost.com. 20 Nov. 2002. 
<http://www.washingtonpost.com> (28. Apr. 2008). 
 
“The Haunted Archives.” Editorial. The Nation. 3 May 2004. 
<http://www.thenation.com/doc/20040503/editors> (6 Dec. 2007). 
 
The White House. Ari Fleischer. Press Briefing. 26 Sept. 2001. 
<http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09> (27 Sept. 2007). 
 
The White House. Ari Fleischer. Press Briefing. 1 Nov. 2001. 
<http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/11> (12 Dec. 2007). 
 
The White House. “New White House Office Coordinates Global Communications.” News 
Release. 21 Jan. 2003. <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/01/> (20 Feb. 2008). 
 
The White House. “President Bush Signs Homeland Security Act.” Executive Order. 25 Nov. 
2002. <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/11/> (5 Mar. 2008). 
 
The White House. “President Delivers State of the Union Address.” News Release. 29 Jan. 2002. 
<http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/01/> (26 Mar. 2008). 
 
87 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
The White House. “President Signs Anti-Terrorism Bill.” News Release. 26 Oct. 2001. 
<http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/10/> (13 Feb. 2008). 
 
The White House. “Title I- Department of Homeland Security.” Bill Release. 
<http://www.whitehouse.gov/deptofhomeland/bill/title1.html> (20 Feb. 2008). 
 
U.S. Department of Defense. Address at the 88th Annual American Legion National Convention. 
Speech Transcript. 29 Aug. 2006. 
<http://www.defenselink.mil/Speeches/Speech.aspx?SpeechID=1033> (24 April 2008). 
 
U.S. Department of Defense. Secretary Rumsfeld interview with Jim Lehrer. News Transcript. 
19 Sept. 2002. <http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=3656> (26 
Mar. 2008). 
 
U.S. Department of Homeland Security. “Title II- Information Analysis and Infrastructure 
Protection.” 25 Nov. 2002. <http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/hr_5005_enr.pdf> (28 Apr. 
2008). 
 
U.S. Department of State. Richard Boucher. Daily Press Briefing. 24 Sept. 2001. 
<http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2001> (7 Dec. 2007).  
 
“VOA Charter.” Voice of America. <http://www.voanews.com/english/about/VOACharter.cfm> 
(6 Dec. 2007). 
 
Walsh, Kenneth T. “What’s Behind Bush’s Vietnam- Iraq Analogy.” CBSNews.com. 24 Aug. 
2007. <http://www.cbsnews.com> (8 Nov. 2007). 
 
Weeks, Linton. “Guarding the Past: The Archivist’s Mild Manner Belies the Uproar Over His 
New Job.” WashingtonPost.com. 31 Mar. 2005. < http://www.washingtonpost.com> (5 Mar. 
2008). 
 
Weisberg, Jacob. “Ashcroft Deconstructed.” Slate.com. 7 Dec. 2001. 
<http://slate.msn.com/?id=2059538> (28 Apr. 2008). 
 
Wiener, Jon. “The Archives and Allen Weinstein.” The Nation. 17 May 2004. 
<http://www.thenation.com/doc/20040517/wiener> (6 Dec. 2007). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
